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ABSTRACT

ENTREPRENEURIAL DECISION-MAKING UNDER RISK:
PROSPECT THEORY AND DUAL-PROCESS THEORY
Dalong Ma
July 23, 2014

This research addresses the question of why some people become entrepreneurs
whereas others do not. The debate has been going on for decades in entrepreneurship. In
this dissertation, I address this question by decomposing it into two related questions. The
first question is whether entrepreneurs make different decisions compared to nonentrepreneurs when they are facing the same opportunities under risk. The second question
is whether these differences in decision-making (if any) are due to the natural proclivity of
entrepreneurs themselves. To identify the differences of entrepreneurial decision-making
between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, this study investigates the nexus between
entrepreneurs and opportunities from both aspects simultaneously. From an entrepreneur’s
aspect, based on dual-process theory, I examine how different styles of entrepreneurial
thinking influence their decision-making. Considering an opportunity itself, based on
prospect theory, I test how different types of opportunity framing influence entrepreneurial
decision-making.
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The results indicate that entrepreneurs have lower evaluations than nonentrepreneurs do when they are facing the same opportunities under risk. The opportunities
in a loss frame have higher evaluations than those in a gain frame. The evaluations are
higher in System 2 thinking than in System 1 thinking. The findings suggest that
entrepreneurs do make different decisions than non-entrepreneurs and that these
differences are more likely due to the natural proclivities of at least some entrepreneurs.
These findings provide new insights for the entrepreneurial decision-making literature and
enlighten some promising future research.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Chapter Overview
In this chapter, I develop my research questions based on the entrepreneurship
literature. First, I describe my research motivation based on the discussion of a well-known
paper in entrepreneurship. The unresolved questions left by this paper are my motivation
for this dissertation. Broadly, I investigate why some people become entrepreneurs whereas
others do not. Then, in order to specify my research questions, I discuss entrepreneurial
opportunities, entrepreneurial decision-making, and the differences between entrepreneurs
and non-entrepreneurs. Next, I review the nexus between opportunities and entrepreneurs
that is the essence of entrepreneurial decision-making. Unlike other scholars who only have
examined this nexus from either the perspective of opportunities or the perspective of
entrepreneurs, I investigate it from both aspects. On the opportunity side, I am interested
in how different types of framing influence entrepreneurial decision-making. On the
entrepreneur side, I am interested in how different styles of thinking influence
entrepreneurial decision-making. Finally, I specify my research questions.
Motivation
Busenitz and Barney (1997) explored the differences between entrepreneurs and
managers in large organizations. They found that entrepreneurs use biases and heuristics
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more than managers in large organizations when they are making strategic decisions. They
argued that entrepreneurs make many decisions for which there is little or no hard
information because the entrepreneurial environment is uncertain and complex. “In this
context, simplifying biases and heuristics may have a great deal of utility in enabling
entrepreneurs to make decisions that exploit brief windows of opportunity” (Busenitz &
Barney, 1997, p. 14). They concluded “that the extent to which decision-makers deviate
from a strict econometric approach may not be a constant, that different individuals may
utilize biases and heuristics to different degrees” (Busenitz & Barney, 1997, p. 23) and that
“biases and heuristics can be an effective and efficient guide to decision-making” (Busenitz
& Barney, 1997, p. 9).
Busenitz and Barney’s paper (1997) has become one of the most cited papers in
entrepreneurship1. However, there still are three unresolved questions left. First, Busenitz
and Barney (1997) showed that entrepreneurs can make efficient decisions by using biases
and heuristics, however they did not address the quality of these decisions. The efficiency
and effectiveness of results are both important for decision-making. We cannot examine
decision-making only from the perspective of efficiency without regard for the effect of a
decision. In other words, there are two kinds of decision-making: one uses more biases and
heuristics; whereas, the other uses more analysis and calculation. Entrepreneurs can use
the former approach to make efficient decisions. However, we do not know the
effectiveness of their decision-making. If entrepreneurs use more biases and heuristics in
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decision-making, will they make bad decisions or good decisions compared to using more
analysis and calculation?
Second, we do not know whether this cognitive difference of using biases and
heuristics exists between entrepreneurs and the general population because Busenitz and
Barney (1997) only compared entrepreneurs with managers in large organizations. Both
entrepreneurs and managers are special cases from the general population. We cannot make
the conclusion that entrepreneurs use more biases and heuristics than the general
population only based on the observation that entrepreneurs use more biases and heuristics
than managers. There are several possible explanations of this observation. For example,
(a) entrepreneurs use more bias and heuristics than the general population; whereas,
managers are the same as the general population. (b) Entrepreneurs are the same as the
general population; whereas, managers use more analysis and calculation than the general
population. (c) Entrepreneurs use more biases and heuristics than the general population;
whereas, managers use more analysis and calculation than the general population.
Therefore, to examine the differences between entrepreneurs and the general population,
we must sample from these two populations.
Third, even if entrepreneurs were different from the general population regarding
their greater use of biases and heuristics, there is no evidence that “those who are more
susceptible to the use of biases and heuristics in decision-making are the very ones who
are most likely to become entrepreneurs” (Busenitz & Barney, 1997, p. 14). In other words,
we cannot simply conclude that this difference is due to their natural proclivity, which
implies that particular attributes exist before people become entrepreneurs, which may
partially explain why they become entrepreneurs. However, entrepreneurs could be the
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same as the general population when they become entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, due to
environmental uncertainty and complexity, they may adapt to use more biases and
heuristics. In other words, this difference in decision-making may be an acquired attribute
from entrepreneurial practice.
These three unresolved questions connect to my research questions. My first
research question is: do entrepreneurs make different decisions from non-entrepreneurs
when they face opportunities? I focus on the results of their decisions. In other words, I am
interested in the effectiveness of their decisions, which addresses the first unresolved
question. In the meantime, I compare entrepreneurs with non-entrepreneurs, which
addresses the second unresolved question. Furthermore, if I identify any differences in
decision-making between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, I investigate whether these
differences are due to the natural proclivity of entrepreneurs, which drives them to become
entrepreneurs or if the differences evolve after a period of time during which they are
entrepreneurs. Therefore, my second research question addresses the third unresolved
question.
Opportunity
Opportunities are “those situations in which new goods, services, raw materials,
and organizing methods can be introduced and sold at greater than their cost of production”
(Shane & Venkataraman, 2000, p. 220). According to neoclassical economic theory,
because economic actors cannot generate economic wealth under perfect competition, an
opportunity will appear when competitive imperfections exist in markets (Barney, 1986;
Venkataraman, 1997). These competitive imperfections can exist as “important entry
barriers, heterogeneously distributed information or capabilities, significant transaction

4

costs, the opportunity to produce heterogeneous products, nonprofit maximizing entities in
the market, and so forth” (Alvarez, Barney, & Anderson, 2013, p. 302). The opportunities
generate economic wealth that is equal to the difference between the value of an economic
actor’s assets and the cost of those assets (Alvarez et al., 2013).
Although scholars have different perspectives about opportunities based on
different assumptions and boundary conditions, in this dissertation, I only examine
opportunities that exist exogenously and can be discovered by systematic search. In
particular, I consider opportunities that exist ex ante and that have specific risks and payoffs.
People can recognize these risks and payoffs.
Entrepreneurship
Entrepreneurship is a process that is intended to identify, evaluate, and exploit
opportunities. Its focus has been attributed to be the nexus between entrepreneurs and
opportunities (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Shane, 2012). This nexus is also the
fundamental of entrepreneurial decision-making. Scholars have examined both aspects of
this nexus from various perspectives, even though there is still much that we do not
understand about. First, one of the reasons that individuals have different beliefs about
opportunities may be due to their natural proclivities. When people face the same
opportunity, only some of them may think it is feasible. On the other hand, when an
individual faces a variety of opportunities, he or she may not think all of them are feasible
(Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Scholars have examined these individual differences from
various perspectives, such as age and gender (Long, 1982), prior knowledge (Fiet, 2007;
Shane, 2000), human capital (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 1997; Unger, Rauch, Frese,
& Rosenbusch, 2011) , and alertness (McCaffrey, 2013; Tang, Kacmar, & Busenitz, 2012).
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Second, opportunity differences also influence opportunity discovery. Compared
to individual differences, differences in opportunity have been studied much less. Scholars
have examined opportunity differences from various perspectives, even though there is still
much that we do not understand about them. For example, scholars have investigated the
attractiveness of an opportunity (Holland & Shepherd, 2013), the technology required by
an opportunity (Choi & Shepherd, 2004), and the structural alignment of an opportunity
(Gregoire, Barr, & Shepherd, 2010). Another aspect could be the framing of an opportunity,
which refers to an individual’s interpretation of an opportunity. Scholars have found that
the framing of options will influence individuals’ decisions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
In my dissertation, I investigate how different types of framing influence entrepreneurial
decision-making under risk.
Third, scholars have used different theories to investigate the nexus between
entrepreneurs and opportunities, such as, constrained systematic search (Fiet, 2007),
resource based theory (Choi & Shepherd, 2004), threshold theory (Holland & Shepherd,
2013), and evolutionary theory (Aldrich & Martinez, 2001). In addition, other theories may
also help us to understand the nexus between entrepreneurs and opportunities. For example,
prospect theory more accurately explains decision making than expected utility theory
(Camerer, 2004). In my dissertation, I use prospect theory to investigate entrepreneurial
decision-making under risk.
Many previous studies have investigated decision making under risk (Edwards,
1954). Knight (1921) was the first to use the term risk to refer to a situation in which both
outcomes and their probabilities of occurrence are known to the decision maker; whereas
uncertainty refers a situation in which some of outcomes and/or their probabilities of
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occurrence are unknown to the decision maker. The difference between a risk and an
uncertainty is that a risk is measurable; whereas, an uncertainty is unmeasurable (Knight,
1921).
Differences between Entrepreneurs and Non-Entrepreneurs
To begin to understand why some people become entrepreneurs and others do not,
the first step may be to identify the important differences between entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurs. The second step would be to confirm these differences are due to the natural
proclivity of entrepreneurs or acquired attributes from entrepreneurial practice (Alvarez et
al., 2013).
Scholars have examined different factors that are likely to distinguish entrepreneurs
from non-entrepreneurs. Early research focused on personality and demographic
differences, such as age and gender (Long, 1982) and Big-Five personality traits (Wooten,
Timmerman, & Folger, 1999). Researchers have also examined different psychological
factors, such as locus of control (Shapero, 1975), need for achievement (Begley & Boyd,
1988), and affect (Baron, 2008). However, these approaches have identified very few, even
if limited, systematic differences between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs (Busenitz
& Barney, 1997). For example, scholars find personality and demographic differences are
quite small and rarely systematic (Cooper & Dunkelberg, 1987).
Recently scholars have focused on possible cognitive differences, such as
overconfidence and representativeness (Busenitz & Barney, 1997) and intuitiveness
(Allinson, Chell, & Hayes, 2000). Although they have found some differences, it is not
known whether these differences are due to the natural proclivity of some entrepreneurs
that drives them to become entrepreneurs or the acquired attributes that are the result of

7

entrepreneurial practice (Alvarez & Barney, 2007). This dissertation explores these
possible sources of differences.
Entrepreneurial Decision-Making
“Entrepreneurs increasingly operate at the edge of human knowledge in making
pioneering decisions that [may] bring fundamentally new products and services into
existence” (McVea, 2009, p. 491). These decisions are crucial for entrepreneurs and their
firms. For example, scholars have found that the wrong decisions about expected returns
are the major reason for the high failure rate among nascent entrepreneurial firms (Hayward,
Shepherd, & Griffin, 2006). However, the uncertainty and complexity of the
entrepreneurial environment make entrepreneurial decision-making more difficult. As a
result, entrepreneurs may use biases and heuristics to make decisions efficiently (Busenitz
& Barney, 1997).
There is a growing body of work on entrepreneurial decision-making that has found
that entrepreneurs may make decisions based on various heuristics and biases (Busenitz &
Barney, 1997; Kickul, Gundry, Barbosa, & Whitcanack, 2009; McVea, 2009; Shepherd,
2011). For example, scholars have examined overconfidence (Busenitz & Barney, 1997;
Forbes, 2005; Simon, Houghton, & Aquino, 2000), intuition (Blume & Covin, 2011;
Kickul et al., 2009; Mitchell, Friga, & Mitchell, 2005), and affect (Baron, 2008; Foo, Uy,
& Baron, 2009). This kind of research “provides an opportunity to gain a deeper
understanding of within-individual (i.e., intra-individual) variance” (Shepherd, 2011, p.
417).
This dissertation investigates entrepreneurial decision-making based on the nexus
between opportunities and entrepreneurs. Although scholars have examined this nexus for
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decades, most studies only focus on one side of the nexus, either opportunities or
entrepreneurs. To investigate the nature of this nexus further, this dissertation studies both
aspects of it. That is, I investigate both the differences between opportunities and the
differences between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs.
Scholars have provided evidence that biases and heuristics are essential in
entrepreneurial decision-making. Because my dissertation investigates entrepreneurial
decision-making, I must choose the theories that have the power to explain behaviors under
biases and heuristics.
The first theory I chose is prospect theory. Prospect theory argues that a reference
point, framing, a subjective value function, and a weighting function will influence
individuals’ decision-making under risk (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Therefore,
prospect theory can explain how the framing of an opportunity will influence
entrepreneurial decision-making.
The second theory I chose is dual-process theory. Dual-process argues that there
are two systems interactively involved in individuals’ decision-making. Dual-process
theory refers to them as System 1 decision-making, which is a rapid, automatic, associative,
and intuitive process, and System 2 decision-making, which is a slower, rule-governed,
analytic, and deliberate process (Salas, Rosen, & DiazGranados, 2010). If individuals use
more System 1 when they make decisions, they will generate intuition. If individuals use
more system 2 when they make decisions, they will exhibit analysis. It is very rare for an
individual to make a decision only based on one system. System 1 and System 2 are
functioning in parallel and interacting when an individual makes decisions. Thus, an
individual will make an intuitive decision when using more System 1 thinking. Whereas
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regarding a same situation, the individual might make an analytic decision when using
more System 2 thinking. Therefore, I argue that the style of thinking (use more System 1
or System 2) will influence entrepreneurial decision-making. Figure 1 shows the theoretical
structure of this dissertation.

Opportunities

Gain vs. Loss
Framing

Nexus

My Study

Prospect Theory

Entrepreneurs

System 1 vs. System
2 Thinking

Dual- Process Theory

Figure 1. The theoretical structure.

Prospect Theory
Prospect theory has become an influential decision-making perspective, especially
under risky conditions (Birnbaum, 2008; Bromiley, 2010; Holmes, Bromiley, Devers,
Holcomb, & McGuire, 2011). It offers a descriptive model of decision-making under risk
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). It argues that people exhibit
loss aversion, which means that they are more sensitive to losses than to gains when having
to make decisions under risk (Köbberling & Wakker, 2005). Prospect theory argues that
loss aversion reflects on a value function that is concave for gains but convex for losses
and is deeper for losses than for gains (Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, & Paraschiv, 2007;
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Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Schmidt, Starmer, & Sugden, 2008; Tversky & Kahneman,
1991).
In order to demonstrate prospect theory, researchers often confront subjects with a
pair of economic decisions. An individual chooses the higher overall value option based
on a reference point. The reference point is a neutral position used to determine the extent
to which outcomes constitute gains or losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). It is a gain
when an outcome is above the reference point and it is a loss when an outcome is below
the reference point.
For a given question, individuals can make decisions in two different frames: a gain
frame which refers to anticipating an outcome in excess of one’s reference point and a loss
frame which refers to anticipating an outcome below one’s reference point (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1981).
The value of an economic decision depends on outcomes and their associated
probabilities. For example, suppose there is an economic decision with outcomes x and y
with probabilities p and q.
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑣(𝑥) ∗ 𝑤(𝑝) + 𝑣(𝑦) ∗ 𝑤(𝑞)
Here, v(.) is the value function which depicts the subjective value of an outcome
and w(.) is probability weighting function which depicts the decision weight for a
probability.
The value function is subjective as is the utility function, however framing also
influences the subjective value. Under some frames, an individual may associate a higher
value than the utility, and vice versa.
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There are four properties of the value function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Individuals evaluate outcomes relative to reference points; the value function is concave
above the reference point and convex below; the value function incorporates diminishing
sensitivity; and prospect theory assumes that individuals are risk averse, which means they
prefer a sure gain to a set of probabilistic gains with the same expected value. Diminishing
sensitivity means that the difference between the subjective values of two outcomes is
larger, the closer those outcomes are to the reference point (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).
Figure 2 shows the subjective value function.
𝑣(𝑥) = 𝑥 𝑎 ,

𝑥≥0

𝑣(𝑥) = −𝜆|𝑥|𝑎 ,

𝑥≤0

𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑒, 0 < 𝑎 < 1, 𝜆 > 0
In the formulas above, 𝑎 determines the shape of the subjective value function,
which is concave in the gain frame and convex in the loss frame. The 𝜆 is the loss aversion
index, which determines the difference between the values of gains and losses. If 𝜆 > 1,

Subjective Value
20
10
0
-30

-10

10

30

-10
-20
-30
x axis: Outcomes
y axis: Subjective Value

Figure 2. Subjective value.
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an individual will exhibit loss aversion, which means that “losses loom larger than
corresponding gains” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992, p. 303) as shown in Figure 2. The
parameter 𝜆 differs across individuals.
The probability weighting function describes an individual’s subjective weighting
of probabilities. Prospect theory suggests that individuals usually exhibit behavior to
overweight probabilities near 0 while underweighting large probabilities. This
phenomenon results in an inverse “S” shape curve of weighting function. In the equation
below, the 𝑘 + indicates the gain frame and 𝑘 − indicates the loss frame. The 𝑘 + is closely
identical with 𝑘 − for an individual, however they are different across individuals (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1992). Figure 3 shows a hypothetical probability weighting function in the
gain frame.
𝑤

+ (𝑝)

𝑝𝑘

=

+

+

+

1

(𝑝𝑘 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑘 )𝑘 +
𝑤 − (𝑝) =

𝑝𝑘
−

−
−

1

(𝑝𝑘 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑘 )𝑘 −

Figure 3. Hypothetical probability weighting functions.
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I discuss prospect theory in detail in Chapter II.
Dual-Process Theory
There is growing interest in the role of intuition in entrepreneurial decision-making
under risk (Blume & Covin, 2011; Kickul et al., 2009; Mitchell et al., 2005). However most
intuition research in entrepreneurship has a limitation that considers intuition and analysis
as opposite ends of a continuum. For example, Allinson and Hayes (1996) developed the
Cognitive Style Index (CSI) to measure the cognitive style of entrepreneurs, which
indicates whether people are more intuitive or more analytical. Based on CSI, Allinson,
Chell, and Hayes (2000) examined the cognitive styles of entrepreneurs and managers.
They found that entrepreneurs are similar to senior managers in cognitive styles; however,
entrepreneurs are more intuitive than the general population and more intuitive than middle
and junior managers. Based on cognitive style, Kickul et al. (2009) found intuitive
entrepreneurs are more confident in their ability to identify and recognize opportunities
whereas analytical entrepreneurs are more confident in their abilities to assess, evaluate,
plan, and marshal resources.
However, there is a dispute about the cognitive style of individuals. Dual-process
theory argues that there are two distinct systems in human information processing: System
1, which is fast, holistic, and does not require conscious cognitive effort, and System 2,
which is slower, analytic, and rule based (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Salas et al., 2010). If
individuals use more System 1 when they are making decisions, they will exhibit more
intuition. If individuals use more System 2, they are more analytical. These two systems
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are not exclusive; individuals can use them simultaneously. For example, experts can
generate high usage of both systems (Salas et al., 2010). When individuals make decisions,
they often combine the results from both systems. Sometime the results are consistent.
Sometimes the results are different or conflict, thus individuals must either choose one or
compromise between them (Evans & Frankish, 2009).
Scholars refer to System 1 using different names, such as implicit system,
associative system, or intuitive system. Scholars also refer to System 2 using different
names, such as explicit system, rule-based system, rational system, or analytic system.
Although scholars use different terms to describe features of these two systems (see a
summary in Table 1), individuals will exhibit more intuition if they use more System 1
when they are making decisions, and more analysis if they use more System 2.
Table 1
Features Attributed by Various Theorists to the Two Systems of Cognition
System 1
System 2
Evolutionarily old
Evolutionarily recent
Unconscious, preconscious
Conscious
Shared with animals
Uniquely (distinctively) human
Implicit knowledge
Explicit knowledge
Automatic
Controlled
Fast
Slow
Parallel
Sequential
High capacity
Low capacity
Intuitive
Reflective
Contextualized
Abstract
Pragmatic
Logical
Associative
Rule-based
Independent of general intelligence
Linked to general intelligence
(Frankish & Evans, 2009, p. 16)
Between these two types of systems thinking, System 1 thinking draws more
attention from entrepreneurship scholars (Blume & Covin, 2011). Sinclair and Ashkanasy
(2005, p. 357) define intuition as “a non-sequential information processing mode, which
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comprises both cognitive and affective elements and results in direct knowing without any
use of conscious reasoning.” Plessner and Betsch (2008) provided an alternative definition
of intuition:
Intuition is a process of thinking. The input to this process is mostly provided by
knowledge stored in long-term memory that has been primarily acquired via
associative learning. The input is processed automatically and without
conscious awareness. The output of the process is a feeling that can serve as a
basis for judgments and decisions. (p. 4)
Although intuition has been defined in many ways, researchers now agree that there
are three core components of intuition: the inputs, processes, and outcomes (Blume &
Covin, 2011; Salas et al., 2010). My study is consistent with some recent works adopting
Dane and Pratt’s (2007) definition of intuition (Blume & Covin, 2011; Salas et al., 2010).
Dane and Pratt (2007, p. 33) define intuition as “affectively charged judgments that arise
through rapid, non-conscious, and holistic associations.”
While some scholars have found that intuition is related to creativity and innovation,
opportunity recognition, and improved organizational performance (Mitchell et al., 2005),
others have found that analysis can improve entrepreneurial performance. For example,
Delmar and Shane (2003) have found that business planning can help entrepreneurs’
decision-making concerning venture development. Patel and Fiet (2009) have found that
systematic search can improve entrepreneurs’ decision-making concerning firm founding.
However, intuitive thinking is only part of the process of decision-making. Analytic
thinking is also important for decision-making. Recent studies have found that there are
significant differences between intuitive thinking and analytic thinking. For example,
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analytic decision making has been shown to increase unethical behaviors and reduce
altruistic motives (Zhong, 2011), and analytic thinking promotes religious disbelief
(Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012). However, the difference between intuitive and analytic
decision-making has yet to be fully addressed in entrepreneurship literature, especially
when entrepreneurs make decisions under conditions of risk.
Consequently, entrepreneurs use both System 1 and System 2 thinking when they
make decisions. They will be more intuitive when they use more System 1 thinking
whereas they will be more analytic when they use more System 2 thinking. Therefore I
argue that the different styles of thinking (use more System 1 or System 2 thinking) may
influence entrepreneurial decision-making.
I discuss dual-process theory in detail in Chapter II.
Research Questions
Broadly, my dissertation addresses the question: why do some people become
entrepreneurs whereas others do not? I address this question by decomposing it into two
related questions. The first question is whether entrepreneurs make different decisions
compared to non-entrepreneurs. The second question is whether these differences in
decision-making (if any) are due to the natural proclivity of entrepreneurs themselves that
drives them to become entrepreneurs.
The nexus between opportunities and entrepreneurs is the essence of
entrepreneurial decision-making. To understand this nexus, it is better to study it from both
aspects. Prospect theory has become prominent in explaining how different types of
framing influence decisions (Barberis, 2013; Holmes et al., 2011). Whereas, dual-process
theory has become preeminent in explaining how different styles of thinking influence the

17

decisions (Evans, 2008; Salas et al., 2010). Because both prospect theory and dual-process
theory can help us understand entrepreneurial decision-making under risk and there are
many profound studies in each stream, I combine these two theories to investigate
entrepreneurial decision-making based on the nexus between opportunities and
entrepreneurs.
There is another reason that I chose prospect theory and dual-process theory.
Scholars have used these two theories to examine the biases and heuristics in decisionmaking outside of entrepreneurship for decades and discovered many insightful findings
(Barberis, 2013; Evans, 2008). For example, Camerer (2004) has found cumulative
prospect theory has better power than expected utility in explaining the phenomena in ten
fields (see Appendix B). However, no known study has used them to examine
entrepreneurial decision-making. I believe these two theories can significantly improve our
understanding of entrepreneurial decision-making.
In particular, entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs may make different decisions
not only based on the probabilities and payoffs of opportunities but also based on the
different framing of opportunities as well as different styles of thinking. Therefore, I
specify my first research question as:
RQ1: When confronted with opportunities that are framed differently and usage of
different styles of thinking, do entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs make different
decisions?
If I could successfully identify some differences in decision-making between
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, I would have the further chance to examine whether
these cognitive differences were due to the natural proclivity of entrepreneurs or due to
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entrepreneurial practice. In other words, if I observe some differences between
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, are these differences the cause or the result? If they
were the cause, this would mean that these factors were due to the natural proclivity of
some people, which drives them to become entrepreneurs. If they were the result, this
would mean that these factors were acquired attributes from entrepreneurial practice.
Therefore, my second research question is:
RQ2: Are these cognitive differences between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs
due to the natural proclivity of entrepreneurs, which drives them to become entrepreneurs,
or acquired attributes from entrepreneurial practice?
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CHAPTER II
THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES

Chapter Overview
In this chapter, I review prospect theory and dual-process theory in detail. Most
findings from these two theories are based on the general population. However, these two
theories also can explain entrepreneurial decision-making. Based on a literature review, I
develop my hypotheses.
Expected Utility Theory
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argue that decision making under risk is a choice
among prospects. They define a prospect (𝑥1 , 𝑝1 ; 𝑥2 , 𝑝2 ; … ; 𝑥𝑛 , 𝑝𝑛 ) as a contract that yields
outcome 𝑥𝑖 with probability 𝑝𝑖 , where 𝑝1 + 𝑝2 + ⋯ + 𝑝𝑛 = 1. For simplification, I omit
null outcomes. Therefore, (𝑥, 𝑝) = (𝑥, 𝑝; 0, 1 − 𝑝), which is the prospect that there is a
probability 𝑝 to yield 𝑥 and a probability 1 − 𝑝 to yield 0. Also if the outcome is certain,
the prospect is denoted as (𝑥).
To explain an individual’s decision making under risk, scholars developed expected
utility theory (Bernoulli, 1954; Edwards, 1954; Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944).
Expected utility theory suggests that individuals value a prospect based on its
expected utility, which is the probability-weighted utility of the outcomes.
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦: 𝑈(𝑥1 , 𝑝1 ; 𝑥2 , 𝑝2 ; … ; 𝑥𝑛 , 𝑝𝑛 ) = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑢(𝑥𝑖 ) ∗ 𝑝𝑖 ,
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Where each 𝑥𝑖 is a different outcome, 𝑢(𝑥𝑖 ) is the utility of 𝑥𝑖 , and 𝑝𝑖 is the
probability that 𝑥𝑖 will occur. That is, the expected utility of a prospect, U, is the sum of
probability-weighted utilities of all outcomes.
Expected utility theory suggests that individuals prefer more utility. Therefore, a
prospect is acceptable if and only if the prospect will increase utility. The prospect
(𝑥1 , 𝑝1 ; 𝑥2 , 𝑝2 ; … ; 𝑥𝑛 , 𝑝𝑛 ) is acceptable iff 𝑈(𝑤 + 𝑥1 , 𝑝1 ; 𝑤 + 𝑥2 , 𝑝2 ; … ; 𝑤 + 𝑥𝑛 , 𝑝𝑛 ) >
𝑢(𝑤). Here 𝑤 is the initial asset.
Expected utility theory suggests the utility of an outcome depends on an
individual’s initial wealth. Therefore, the same outcome may have different utility for
individuals depending on how much initial wealth they have. For example, a person will
value $100 much more when he or she has zero dollars than when he or she has a million
dollars, that is, the $100 has different marginal utility based on the initial wealth. Marginal
utility is the amount that utility increases with an increase of one unit of the outcome.
Therefore, the marginal utility of an outcome will be influenced by the initial position, that
is, the more initial wealth an individual has, the less the marginal utility he or she will gain
for an outcome. For example, an individual will prefer $200 over $100. The same
individual will still prefer $10,100 over $10,000, however, the strength of preference will
be less. Therefore, the relation between utility and an outcome will be concave because of
decreasing marginal utility, that is, 𝑢 is concave (𝑢′′ < 0).
Expected utility theory suggests that individuals may exhibit risk aversion,
preferring the certain prospect (x) to any probabilistic prospect with the same expected
value x. For example, there are two options: A, get $100 for sure; B, 50% chance to get
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$200, and 50% chance to get $0. Although two options have same expected values,
individuals will prefer option A because of risk aversion.
Prospect Theory
Kahneman & Tversky (1979) critique expected utility theory because it cannot
explain the certainty effect, reflection effect, and isolation effect that individuals exhibit in
decision making under risk. The certainty effect occurs when individuals underweight
outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with
certainty (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). For example, perhaps 𝑈(4,000, .8) < 𝑈(3,000).
That is, individuals prefer a prospect, which has a certain outcome of 3,000 over a prospect
which has .8 probability of 4,000 and .2 probability of 0. Notice that the expected value of
the latter is 3,200. The certainty effect is generated by risk aversion, which is a preference
for a certain outcome over a probabilistic outcome, which has the same expected value as
a certain outcome. Individuals even prefer a certain outcome over some probabilistic
outcomes, even though the risky outcomes may have a higher expected value.
The reflection effect occurs when the reflection of prospects around 0 reverses the
preference order (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). For example, 𝑈(4,000, .8) < 𝑈(3,000)
while 𝑈(−4,000, .8) > 𝑈(−3,000). That is, individuals prefer a prospect, which has .8
probability of 4,000 loss and .2 probability of 0 loss more than the prospect which has
certain loss of 3,000. Therefore, when the prospect is about a loss instead of a gain, the
preference order is reversed.
The isolation effect occurs when an individual discards components that are shared
by all prospects under consideration (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). For example, an
individual would react differently to the following two questions because of the isolation
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effect. Both questions have two steps: first, the participant is given a bonus; second, the
participant chooses between two options.
Question 1: you have been given 1,000, which one do you prefer?
A: (1,000, .50),

and

B: (500).

Question 2: you have been given 2,000, which one do you prefer?
C: (-1,000, .50),

and

D: (-500).

If considering both steps of both questions, the utilities of both questions are equal.
That is, the final wealth of A and C are equal, and the final wealth of B and D are equal. If
participants integrate the bonus of the first step and the prospects of the second step, they
should make similar decisions between question 1 and question 2. However, the results do
not support this prediction. The results show that most participants prefer option B for
question 1; whereas, most participants prefer option C for question 2, which means that the
participants only compared the prospects of the second step and omitted the bonus of the
first step. If only considering the second step, this change in preference is consistent with
the reflection effect. Participants change their decisions when the outcomes change from
gains to losses. Therefore, individuals are more concerned about the change of their wealth,
rather than the final wealth. Expected utility theory cannot explain these behaviors.
Because expected utility theory cannot explain the certainty, reflection and
isolation effects, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) develop prospect theory. They argue that
there are two phases in the process of decision making under risk: the editing phase and
the evaluation phase. “The editing phase consists of a preliminary analysis of the offered
prospects, which often yields a simpler representation of these prospects. In the second

23

phase, the edited prospects are evaluated and the prospect of highest value is chosen”
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 274).
In the editing phase, individuals organize and reformulate the options in order to
simplify subsequent evaluation and choice. There are six operations in this phase: coding,
combination, segregation, cancellation, simplification, and detection of dominance.
Coding is the operation in which individuals could perceive outcomes as gains or losses
according to their reference point. The formulation of the offered prospects and the
expectations of the decision maker influence the reference point. The reference point
usually corresponds to the current asset position of the decision maker. Therefore,
individuals’ coding of gains or losses is consistent with the actual amounts that are received
or paid. Combination is the operation through which individuals could simplify prospects
by combining the probabilities associated with identical outcomes. For example, the
prospect (200, .25; 200, .25) will be simplified to (200, .50). Segregation is the operation
through which individuals could segregate a riskless component from the risky component.
For example, the prospect (300, .80; 200, .20) is seen as a sure gain of 200 and the risky
prospect (100, .80). Cancellation is the operation through which individuals could discard
the common constituents or the components that are shared by prospects. The isolation
effect is the result of cancellation. Simplification is the operation through which individuals
could simplify prospects by rounding probabilities or outcomes. Detection of dominance
is the operation through which individuals could scan the prospects to detect dominant
alternatives. For example, (500, .20; 101, .49) will dominate (500, .15; 99, .51) if
individuals simplify the second outcome of both prospects to (100, .50) (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979).
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The value function
In the evaluation phase, individuals evaluate each of the edited prospects and
choose the prospect of highest value (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). To evaluate the overall
value of an edited prospect, 𝑉, they introduce two scales, 𝜋 and 𝑣. “𝜋 associates with each
probability 𝑝 a decision weight 𝜋(𝑝), which reflects the impact of 𝑝 on the over-all value
of the prospect” and “𝑣 assigns to each outcome 𝑥 a number 𝑣(𝑥), which reflects the
subjective value of that outcome” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 275). Figure 5 shows
a hypothetical value function.

Figure 4. A hypothetical value function.
Adopted from “Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk” by
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric
Society, 47, p. 279.

Kahnman and Tversky (1979, p. 279) propose “that the value function is (i) defined
on deviations from the reference point; (ii) generally concave for gains and commonly
convex for losses; (iii) steeper for losses than for gains.”
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There is a simple prospect (𝑥, 𝑝; 𝑦, 𝑞). In such a prospect, an individual receives 𝑥
with probability 𝑝 , 𝑦 with probability 𝑞 , and nothing with probability 1 − 𝑝 − 𝑞 ,
where 𝑝 + 𝑞 ≤ 1. If both 𝑥 and 𝑦 are positive, the prospect is strictly positive. If x and y
are negative, the prospect is strictly negative. If a prospect is neither strictly positive nor
strictly negative, it is regular. Therefore, a regular prospect has at least one non-positive
outcome and at least one nonnegative outcome.
If (𝑥, 𝑝; 𝑦, 𝑞) is a regular prospect, (i.e., 𝑝 + 𝑞 < 1, 𝑜𝑟 𝑥 ≤ 0 ≤ 𝑦 𝑜𝑟 𝑥 ≥ 0 ≥ 𝑦),
then the overall value of the prospect is
𝑉(𝑥, 𝑝; 𝑦, 𝑞) = 𝜋(𝑝)𝑣(𝑥) + 𝜋(𝑞)𝑣(𝑦)

①

Where 𝑣(0) = 0, and 𝜋(. ) is weighting function 𝜋(0) = 0, and 𝜋(1) = 1 . I
discuss the weighing function in detail below.
If (𝑥, 𝑝; 𝑦, 𝑞) is a strictly positive or negative prospect, 𝑝 + 𝑞 = 1, 𝑥 < 𝑦 <
0 𝑜𝑟 𝑥 > 𝑦 > 0, then the overall value of the prospect is
𝑉(𝑥, 𝑝; 𝑦, 𝑞) = 𝑣(𝑦) + 𝜋(𝑝)[𝑣(𝑥) − 𝑣(𝑦)]

②

Equation ② shows the segregation operation. That is, the value of a strictly positive
prospect equals the value of the smaller outcome plus the probability of the greater outcome
times the difference of values between two outcomes. In other words, there is a prospect
that has two possible gains, thus, people can achieve the lower gain for sure and get the
higher gain for a chance (equal to the higher gain’s probability).
Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p. 278) “hypothesize that the value function for
changes of wealth is normally concave above the reference point (𝑣 ′′ (𝑥) < 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥 > 0)
and often convex below it (𝑣 ′′ (𝑥) > 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥 < 0). That is, the marginal value of both gains
and losses generally decreases with their magnitude.”
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The weighting function
Prospect theory relaxes the weighting of the values. Instead of probabilities,
decision weights multiply the values of each outcome.
Decision weights are inferred from choices between prospects…However,
decision weights are not probabilities: they do not obey the probability
axioms and they should not be interpreted as measures of degree or belief”
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 280).
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) develop a weighting function 𝜋, which relates
decision weights to stated probabilities. Hence, 𝜋 is an increasing function of 𝑝, with
𝜋(0) = 0 and 𝜋(1) = 1. That is, individuals weight more of the events that have higher
probability to occur. Individuals place a weight 0 on the events that would never occur and
1 on the event that would always occur.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose that small probabilities are generally overweighted and that the weighting function for small probabilities is a sub-additive function.
That is 𝜋(𝑝) > 𝑝 and 𝜋(𝑟𝑝) > 𝑟𝜋(𝑝) for small 𝑝 . Figure 6 shows a hypothetical
weighting function. The solid line shows the subjective weighting and the dotted line shows
the 45-degree line. If the solid line is above the dotted line, the subjective weighting is
higher than the probability. If the solid line is under the dotted line, the subjective weighting
is lower than the probability. Figure 6 shows that individuals tend to overweight small
probability and underweight medium and large probability.
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Figure 5. A hypothetical weighting function.
Adopted from “Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk” by
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric
Society, 47, p. 283.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) also note the weighting function does not work very
well near the end points, where 𝜋(0) = 0 and 𝜋(1) = 1. “Because people are limited in
their ability to comprehend and evaluate extreme probabilities, highly unlikely events are
either ignored or overweighed, and the difference between high probability and certainty
is either neglected or exaggerated” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 283). They also
provide an interesting example:
The following example, due to Zeckhauser, illustrates the hypothesized
nonlinearity of 𝜋. Suppose you are compelled to play Russian roulette, but are
given the opportunity to purchase the removal of one bullet from the loaded
gun. Would you pay as much to reduce the number of bullets from four to three
as you would to reduce the number of bullets from one to zero? Most people
feel that they would be willing to pay much more for a reduction of the
probability of death from 1/6 to zero than for a reduction from 4/6 to 3/6.
Economic considerations would lead one to pay more in the latter case, where
the value of money is presumably reduced by the considerable probability that
one will not live to enjoy it. (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 283)
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Cumulative Prospect Theory
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) developed a new version of prospect theory,
cumulative prospect theory, which can apply to more than two prospects under risk and
uncertainty. Cumulative prospect theory also differentiates between the value function and
weighting for gains and losses.
Cumulative prospect theory introduces two principles, diminishing sensitivity and
loss aversion, to explain individuals’ behavior when making decisions. Diminishing
sensitivity refers to the fact that “the impact of a change diminishes with the distance from
the reference point” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992, p. 303). Loss aversion refers to “losses
loom larger than corresponding gains” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992, p. 303).
The diminishing sensitivity applies to both value functions and weighting functions.
“In evaluation of outcomes, the reference point serves as a boundary that distinguishes
gains from losses” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992, p. 303).
The value function of Cumulative prospect theory is:
𝑥𝛼 , 𝑥 ≥ 0
𝑣(𝑥) = {
−𝜆(−𝑥)𝛼 , 𝑥 < 0
The weighting functions of Cumulative prospect theory are:
𝑤

+ (𝑝)

𝑝𝜔

=

+

+

+

1

(𝑝𝜔 + (1 − 𝑝)𝜔 )𝜔+
𝑤

− (𝑝)

=

𝑝𝜔

−

1

(𝑝𝜔− + (1 − 𝑝)𝜔− )𝜔−

The experimental results of (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) show that 𝛼 is 0.88, 𝜆 is
2.25, 𝜔+ is 0.61 and 𝜔− is 0.69. The results also show there are four patterns of risk
attitudes: risk aversion for gains of high probability; risk seeking for gains of low
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probability; risk seeking for losses of high probability; risk aversion for losses of low
probability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).
Tversky and Kahneman (1992, p. 316) propose cumulative prospect theory as a
“descriptive theory in which 1) the objects of choice are prospects framed in terms of gains
and losses, 2) the valuation rule is a two-part cumulative functional, and 3) the value
function is S-shaped and the weighting functions are inverse S-shaped”.
Scholars have found cumulative prospect theory can explain decision making
phenomena in many fields better than EU (Barberis, 2013; Camerer, 2004). See the
Appendix A for a summary.
Dual-Process Theory
Wason and Evans (1975) first advanced the dual-process theory in 1975. They
found there is a dual processing between behavior and conscious thought when individuals
are making decisions. They provided two different underlying processes: a performance
process and an introspection process. “The processes underlying reasoning performance,
e.g., matching bias, are not generally available for introspective report” and “Introspection
accounts of performance reflect a tendency for the subject to construct a justification for
his own behavior consistent with his knowledge of the situation” (Wason & Evans, 1975,
p. 149). After that, researchers developed many labels for each of these systems, see Table
2.
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Table 2
Different Labels for System 1 and System 2
System 1
System 2
Automatic
Controlled
Heuristic
Analytic
Implicit
Explicit
Experiential
Rational
Intuitive
Analytic
Associative
Rule-based
System 1
System 2
Holistic
Analytic
Reflexive
Reflective
Conscious
Unconscious

(Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977)
(Evans, 1984)
(Reber & Squire, 1994)
(Epstein, 1994)
(Hammond, 1996)
(Sloman, 1996)
(Stanovich, 1999)
(Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001)
(Lieberman, Jarcho, & Satpute, 2004)
(Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006)

Evans (2008) provided four clusters of difference between these two systems:
consciousness, evolution, functional characteristics and individual differences. First,
System 1 is largely unconscious; whereas, System 2 is consciously accessible. Second,
System 1 evolved earlier than System 2. Third, System 1 is rapid and automatic whereas
System 2 is slow and controlled. Fourth, there is little between-individual variation of
System 1 because it is independent of general intelligence and working memory. However,
there is more between-individual variation of System 2 because of individuals’ capacity
and ability. See Table 3.
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Table 3
Clusters of Attributes Associated with Dual Systems of Thinking
System 1
System 2
Cluster 1 (Consciousness)
Unconscious (preconscious)
Conscious
Implicit
Explicit
Automatic
Controlled
Low effort
High effort
Rapid
Slow
High capacity
Low capacity
Default process
Inhibitory
Holistic, perceptual
Analytic, reflective
Cluster 2 (Evolution)
Evolutionarily old
Evolutionarily recent
Evolutionarily rationality
Individual rationality
Shared with animals
Uniquely human
Nonverbal
Linked to language
Modular cognition
Fluid intelligence
Cluster 3 (Functional characteristics)
Associative
Rule based
Domain specific
Domain general
Contextualized
Abstract
Pragmatic
Logical
Parallel
Sequential
Stereotypical
Egalitarian
Cluster 4 (Individual differences)
Universal
Heritable
Independent of general intelligence
Linked to general intelligence
Independent of working memory
Limited by working memory capacity
(Evans, 2008, p. 261)
Early work on dual-process theory focused on the details of the properties of each
system, however, recent research has shifted to understand how these systems work
together (Salas et al., 2010). It is very rare for an individual to make a decision only based
on one system. System 1 and System 2 are functioning in parallel and interacting when an
individual makes decisions. System 2 can evaluate the results of System 1. For example,
the heuristic judgments associated with System 1 will lead to biases. However, analytic
reasoning, which is associated with System 2, may intervene with the heuristic judgment
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to improve them and mitigate biases (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). The interaction
between the two systems can generally be framed as “System 1 subservience to System 2”
(Salas et al., 2010, p. 946). That is, the results from System 1 serve as inputs of System 2,
and then System 2 mitigates biases, adjusts direction or rejects the results of System 1.
There are other different perspectives about the relationship between two systems.
For example, Haidt (2001) provides an “emotional dog” model to explain the behaviors of
individuals when they are facing ethical questions by using dual-process theory. In this
model, System 1 dominates the processing of moral judgments. The job of System 2 is
primarily to find the rationalization of the moral decision. The role of the rationalization is
to convince the decision makers that they have made right decisions. Moreover, these
rationalizations rarely change the initial judgment of System 1.
Hypotheses Development
People may have different subjective values for opportunities. Both the differences
among opportunities and the differences among individuals may influence their subjective
evaluations of opportunities. Scholars have tested the positive relationship between the
elements of opportunity and the subjective value of opportunity in different perspectives.
The higher the probability of the opportunity is, the greater the subjective value of the
opportunity is. In addition, the higher the outcome of the opportunity is, the greater the
subjective value of the opportunity is. In the dissertation, I focus on the moderators of these
relationships.
Prospect theory argues individuals have different subjective values for the same
outcome based on their reference points (value function, parameter 𝑎). A reference point
is the distinction between gains and losses. Individuals could change their attitude that they
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weigh losses more than gains (loss aversion index, parameter 𝜆). Individuals also have their
own weighting function (parameters:𝑘 + , 𝑘 − ), which over-weights small probabilities and
underweights medium and large probabilities. Therefore parameters 𝑎, 𝜆, 𝑘 + , 𝑘 − will
determine an individual’s subjective evaluation of risky decisions (Tversky & Kahneman,
1992). The parameter 𝑎 determines the shape of a subjective value curve. The subjective
value will be closer to the expected value when 𝑎 is closer to 1. The subjective value will
equal the expected value when 𝑎 equal to 1. The parameter 𝜆 determines the loss aversion.
The loss aversion will be less when 𝜆 is closer to 1. There will be no loss aversion when 𝜆
equals 1, which means an individual has the same subjective value for gains and losses.
The parameters 𝑘 + , 𝑘 − determine the shape of the weighting function curve. The weighting
function will be closer to probability when 𝑘 + and 𝑘 − are closer to 1. The weighting
function will equal to probability when 𝑘 + and 𝑘 − are equal to 1. That is, the curve of the
weighting function will become a straight line and all subjective weighting of probabilities
equal to the actual probabilities.
Hypothesis 1: The framing of opportunity moderates the relationship between
the elements of opportunity (outcome and probability) and the subjective value
of the opportunity; that is, the subjective value of the opportunity will be higher
when the opportunity can be described in a loss frame rather than in a gain
frame.
Based on prospect theory, the subjective value of the opportunity equals the product
of the subjective value function and the weighting function. I used the natural logarithm to
transform the multiplication into a linear relation. Therefore,
𝐿𝑛𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
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𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒(𝑥) = 𝑎 ln 𝑥
𝑝𝜔

𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑝) = ln

1

(𝑝𝜔 + (1 − 𝑝)𝜔 )𝜔
Based on the experimental results of Tversky and Kahneman (1992), here 𝑎 =
0.88, 𝜔 = 0.66, 𝑥 = 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒, 𝑝 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦.
Hypothesis 1a: The LnEvaluation will be higher when the opportunity is
described in loss frame than in gain frame.
Hypothesis 1b: The framing of opportunity moderates the relationship between
the LnSubOutcome and the LnEvaluation; that is, the LnEvaluation will be
higher when the opportunity is described in loss frame than in gain frame.
Hypothesis 1c: The framing of opportunity moderates the relationship between
the LnSubProbability and the LnEvaluation; that is, the LnEvaluation will be
higher when the opportunity is described in loss frame than in gain frame.
Entrepreneurship is the process of identification, evaluation, and exploitation of
opportunities and it involves the nexus between entrepreneurs and opportunities (Shane &
Venkataraman, 2000; Shane, 2012). Entrepreneurial opportunities are “those situations in
which new goods, services, raw materials, and organizing methods can be introduced and
sold at greater than their cost of production” (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000, p. 220).
However, because of bounded rationality, entrepreneurs may not realize the objective value
of opportunities. They may generate different subjective values based on their intuition that
originates in System 1. “When there are cues that an intuitive judgment could be wrong,
System 2 can impose a different strategy, replacing intuition by careful reasoning”
(Kahneman & Klein, 2009, p. 519). The interactions between System 1 and System 2 are
complex. However, dual-process theory argues that System 1 is subservient to System 2.
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The analytic thinking can evaluate the product of intuitive processing, uncover new
information that is acted on by the intuitive system, and generate post hoc rationalizations
for moral judgment (Salas et al., 2010). Therefore, an individual’s subjective values for an
opportunity will be lower when they use more System 1 than System 2.
Hypothesis 2: The style of thinking moderates the relationship between the
elements of opportunity (outcome and probability) and the subjective value of
the opportunity; that is, the subjective value of the opportunity will be higher
when people use more System 2 thinking than System 1 thinking.
To be more specific,
Hypothesis 2a: The LnEvaluation will be higher when people use more System
2 thinking than System 1 thinking.
Hypothesis 2b: The style of thinking moderates the relationship between the
LnSubOutcome and the LnEvaluation; that is, the LnEvaluation will be higher
when people use more System 2 thinking than System 1 thinking.
Hypothesis 2c: The style of thinking moderates the relationship between the
LnSubProbability and the LnEvaluation; that is, the LnEvaluation will be higher
when people use more System 2 thinking than System 1 thinking.
Dual process theory argues that the rapid and unconscious processing of System 1
is based on past experience (Salas et al., 2010). From running their businesses,
entrepreneurs gain experience about markets, customers, technologies, and organizing.
This experience can help them make decisions about opportunities. For example, repeat
entrepreneurs discover more valuable opportunities than nascent entrepreneurs (Fiet,
Clouse, & Norton, 2004), entrepreneurs can discover different opportunities based on their
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experience (Shane, 2000), experience can help entrepreneurs better understand
opportunities that they are facing (Shepherd & DeTienne, 2005), and habitual
entrepreneurs, especially those who have experienced failure, are less over-optimistic
(Ucbasaran, Westhead, Wright, & Flores, 2010). On the other hand, non-entrepreneurs are
more likely to be inaccurate when estimating the values of opportunities because they lack
experience. Thus non-entrepreneurs’ subjective evaluations will deviate more from
objective values than those of entrepreneurs. Scholars have found that analysis can improve
entrepreneurial performance. For example, Delmar and Shane (2003) have found that
business planning can help entrepreneurs’ decision making concerning venture
development. Patel and Fiet (2009) have found that systematic search can improve an
entrepreneur’s decision making concerning firm founding. Therefore, entrepreneurs will
generate lower subjective values than non-entrepreneurs who do not have prior knowledge
regarding opportunities.
Hypothesis 3: The status of entrepreneurs moderates the relationship between
the elements of opportunity (outcome and probability) and the subjective value
of the opportunity; that is, non-entrepreneurs have higher subjective evaluations
of opportunities than entrepreneurs.
To be more specific,
Hypothesis 3a: The LnEvaluation will be higher for non-entrepreneurs than for
entrepreneurs.
Hypothesis 3b: The status of entrepreneurs moderates the relationship between
the LnSubOutcome and the LnEvaluation; that is, the LnEvalation will be higher
for non-entrepreneurs than for entrepreneurs.
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Hypothesis 3c: The status of entrepreneurs moderates the relationship between
the LnSubProbability and the LnEvaluation; that is, the LnEvaluation will be
higher for non-entrepreneurs than for entrepreneurs.

Figure 7 shows the hypothetical model of H1 to H3.

Gain vs.
Loss

Venture Idea
Scenarios

System 1 vs.
System 2

H2

H1

Payoff
Probability

Entr. vs.
Non-Entr.

H3

Subjective
Value

Figure 6. Hypothetical model of H1 to H3.

Why some people become entrepreneurs while others do not is a central question
in entrepreneurship. Scholars have looked for the answers for decades (Busenitz & Barney,
1997; Shane, 2012). Recently, they have found systematic cognitive differences in
entrepreneurial decision making between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs (Alvarez et
al., 2013). However, there is still a question left: are these differences the ones that drive
people to become entrepreneurs or the results of entrepreneurial practice? We cannot settle
this argument by simply examining the differences between entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurs because we would observe the differences between them in either situation.
I develop a new method to test this argument. I examine the differences among nonentrepreneurs, nascent entrepreneurs, and experienced entrepreneurs, instead of the
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differences just between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. Nascent entrepreneurs are
in the process of starting their first businesses. Experienced entrepreneurs have started a
business more than one year and/or started more than one business. Experienced
entrepreneurs have more entrepreneurial experience than nascent entrepreneurs.
Specifically, experienced entrepreneurs have more experience starting and running a
business and possibly even failure of a business.
Consequently, if these cognitive differences in decision-making are the ones that
drive people to become entrepreneurs, we should observe a significant difference in
cognitive decision-making between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. At the same
time, we should observe no significant difference between nascent entrepreneurs and
experienced entrepreneurs.
Hypothesis 4: Entrepreneurs’ subjective evaluations of opportunities are
different from those of non-entrepreneurs; however, nascent entrepreneurs’
subjective evaluations of opportunities would not be different from those of
experienced entrepreneurs.
If these cognitive differences in decision-making result from entrepreneurial
practice, we should observe significant differences in cognitive decision-making between
nascent entrepreneurs; at same time, we should observe no significant difference between
non-entrepreneurs and nascent entrepreneurs.
Hypothesis 5: Nascent entrepreneurs’ subjective evaluations of opportunities
are not different from those of non-entrepreneurs; however, nascent
entrepreneurs’ subjective evaluations of opportunities would be different from
those of experienced entrepreneurs.
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

Chapter Overview
To test the hypotheses, I have designed a 2x2x2 experimental study. In this chapter,
I provide the details of my research design and survey design.
Research Design
The empirical tests of prospect theory usually ask participants their preferences
between pairs of gambling choices. However, choosing from a pair of gambling choices
cannot fully reflect a participant’s subjective evaluation. For example, when comparing
choice A and B, Participant M may think that choice A is much better than B. Participant
N may think that choice A is a little better than B. The result is that both Participant M and
N will choose A. The result cannot reflect the strength of the participants’ preferences.
Therefore, this kind of design loses the variance of participants’ subjective evaluation.
In this study, I asked participants to report their subjective evaluation of different
business scenarios. By this design, I can determine the parameters in prospect theory that
are different among people. Therefore, I can test decision making between and within
different groups of entrepreneurs. Specifically, I can test whether entrepreneurs make
different decisions than non-entrepreneurs when they are facing the same opportunity,
whether entrepreneurs make different decisions when they rely more on System 1 than
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System 2, and whether entrepreneurs make different decisions when they are under a gainframe than under a loss-frame.
This study is a 2x2x2 experimental study: non-entrepreneurs vs. entrepreneurs,
System 1 vs. System 2 thinking, and gain-frame vs. loss-frame. Among entrepreneurs, I
also divided them into two subgroups: nascent entrepreneurs and repeat entrepreneurs.
An experimental manipulation can provide two important advantages for a research
design. First, the manipulation can present strong evidence of causality. The experimenter
can change the independent variables in a systematic way. If the dependent variables
change right after the manipulations and are significantly related to the manipulation, we
have strong evidence that the independent variables are the cause of dependent variables.
Second, the manipulation can mitigate endogeneity. Manipulation allows us to control
extraneous variables by varying the variables we are interested in while keeping extraneous
variables at similar levels. In this study, I manipulated independent variables, which are
the probability and outcome of venture ideas, and moderators, which are participants’
styles of thinking and the ways to describe the opportunities.
Independent variable: Probability and outcome of opportunities. In this study,
I focus on two elements of opportunities: probability and outcome. I manipulated
probability in 5 levels (5%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 95%) and outcome in 4 levels ($100,000,
$200,000, $500,000 and $1,000,000). I discuss the design later in this dissertation.
Dependent variable: The subjective value of opportunities. I examined directly
the participants’ subjective evaluation of venture ideas.
Moderators. Moderators include System 1 vs. System 2 thinking, gain vs. loss
frame, and entrepreneurs vs. non-entrepreneurs.
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System 1 vs. System 2 thinking manipulation. To manipulate intuitive or analytic
thinking, this study followed Zhong’s (2011) method. Prior research has shown that
calculating math problems can manipulate participants’ System 1 thinking whereas
examining feelings can manipulate their System 2 thinking (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004;
Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007; Zhong, 2011). To manipulate System 1 or System 2
thinking, this study asked participants to answer questions about their feelings or calculate
math questions.
Gain vs. loss frame manipulation. This study used the maximum willingness to
pay (gain frame) and minimum willingness to accept (loss frame) framework to manipulate
gain and loss frames (Abdellaoui et al., 2007; Schmidt et al., 2008). In gain frame,
respondents were told there is a venture idea that has p probability of success and it will
earn m profit if it succeeds. The respondents answered the maximum amount of money
they would pay to buy the idea. Whereas in loss frame, respondents were told they have a
venture idea that has p probability of success and it will earn m profit if it succeeds. The
respondents answered the minimum amount of money they would be willing to sell the
idea.
Sample size. I used two software programs, Optimal Design (Raudenbush, 2011)
and PowerUp! (Dong & Maynard, 2013), to calculate the minimum required sample size.
Both of them report the appropriate sample size is 200, when the anticipated effect size
is .2 (small) and the expected intra-class correlation (ICC) is .2. Therefore, I collected 100
entrepreneur samples for Experiment 1 and 100 general population samples for Experiment
2. Then I combined two samples to test my hypotheses.
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Experiment 1
I used a sample of real entrepreneurs. See chapter 4 for how the sample of real
entrepreneurs was assembled.
The participants were randomly assigned to two groups: Group A and Group B.
Participants in Group A took System 1 manipulation and then evaluated venture scenarios.
Participants in Group B took System 2 manipulation and then evaluated venture scenarios.
Each group was randomly divided into two subgroups: Subgroup 1 and Subgroup 2.
Participants in Subgroup 1 evaluated scenarios in order 1 and participants in Subgroup 2
evaluated scenarios in order 2. Each subgroup was randomly divided into two subgroups:
Subgroup I and Subgroup II. Participants in Subgroup I evaluated scenarios in Gain frame
first then evaluated scenarios in Loss frame. Participants in Subgroup II evaluated scenarios
in Loss frame first then evaluated scenarios Gain in frame. Finally, all participants
answered demographic questions.
An opportunity’s value is based on two variables: the probability of success and
payoff. To test the subjective value function, I fixed the probability at 25% and varied the
payoffs. Because the subjective value function is concave in the gain frame and convex in
the loss frame, I need at least 4 observations in each frame. Thus, the payoffs were
$100,000, $200,000, $500,000, and $1,000,000. To test the subjective weighting function,
I fixed the payoff to $200,000 and varied the probability of success. Because the subjective
weighting function is an inverse “S” shape curve, I need at least five observations. Thus,
the probabilities were 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 95%. The two parts shared a scenario (25%,
$200,000); therefore, there were eight different scenarios. Each scenario was repeated
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twice in the Gain frame and the Loss frame. Therefore, each participant evaluated 16
scenarios of venture ideas.
A sample of the Gain frame scenario:
There is a venture idea which has a 25% chance to get a $100,000 payoff and
75% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the maximum amount you will pay to buy
this idea.
A sample of the Loss frame scenario:
You have a venture idea which has a 5% chance to get a $200,000 payoff and a
95% chance to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the minimum amount for which you
will sell this idea.
At the end of the experiment, I asked questions of control variables and
demographic questions.
Figure 8 shows the survey flow.

Gain - Loss

Order 1

Gain - Loss
Loss - Gain
Gain - Loss

Order 1

Loss - Gain

System 2
Thinking

Gain - Loss

Order 2

Loss - Gain

Figure 7. Survey flow.
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Experiment 2
I used a general population sample to repeat the Experiment 1 to test whether there
are differences between non-entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs.
Survey Design
To manipulate System 1 thinking or System 2 thinking, I asked participants to
answer five questions about their feeling or to calculate five questions (Zhong, 2011). I list
the manipulation questions below.
Manipulation of System 1 thinking
We are interested in people’s impressions of public figures. Please base your
answers to the following questions on the feelings you experience.
When you hear the name "George Clooney", what do you feel? Please use one word
to describe your predominant feeling: ____________.
When you hear the name "George W. Bush", what do you feel? Please use one word
to describe your predominant feeling: ____________.
When you hear the name "Princess Diana", what do you feel? Please use one word
to describe your predominant feeling: ____________.
When you hear the words "9/11", what do you feel? Please use one word to describe
your predominant feeling: ____________.
When you hear the word "baby", what do you feel? Please use one word to describe
your predominant feeling: ____________.
Manipulation of System 2 thinking
We are interested in the people’s calculations of word problems. Please work
carefully and deliberately to calculate the answers to the questions posed below.
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If an object travels at five feet per minute, then by your calculations how many feet
will it travel in 360 seconds? ______ feet
Suppose a student bought a pen and a pencil for a total of $11, and that the pen
cost $10 more than the pencil. Then, by your calculations how much did the pencil cost?
______
If a consumer bought 30 books for $540, then, by your calculations, on average,
how much did the consumer pay for each book? $____
If a baker bought nine pounds of flour at $1.50 per pound, then, by your
calculations how much did the baker pay in total? $____
If a company bought 15 computers for $1200 each, then, by your calculations, how
much did the company pay in total? $____
Scenarios
To examine participants’ subjective values of opportunities, I asked participants to
evaluate different scenarios of venture ideas. To manipulate gain frame, I asked
participants to write down the maximum price to buy the venture ideas. To manipulate loss
frame, I asked participants to write down the minimum price to sell the venture ideas. I list
the scenarios of venture ideas below.
Gain frame
Scenario 1.

There is a venture idea which has a 5% chance to

earn a $200,000 payoff and a 95% chance to get a $0 payoff. Please
tell us the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea.
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Scenario 2.

There is a venture idea which has a 25% chance to

earn a $100,000 payoff and a 75% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us
the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea.
Scenario 3.

There is a venture idea which has a 25% chance to

earn a $200,000 payoff and a 75% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us
the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea.
Scenario 4.

There is a venture idea which has a 25% chance to

earn a $500,000 payoff and a 75% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us
the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea.
Scenario 5.

There is a venture idea which has a 25% chance to

earn a $1,000,000 payoff and a 75% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell
us the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea.
Scenario 6.

There is a venture idea which has a 50% chance to

earn a $200,000 payoff and a 5% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us
the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea.
Scenario 7.

There is a venture idea which has a 75% chance to

earn a $200,000 payoff and a 25% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us
the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea.
Scenario 8.

There is a venture idea which has a 95% chance to

earn a $200,000 payoff and a 5% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us
the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea.
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Loss frame
Scenario 1.

You have a venture idea which has a 5% chance to

get a $200,000 payoff and a 95% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us
the minimum amount you will sell this idea.
Scenario 2.

You have a venture idea which has a 25% chance to

get a $100,000 payoff and a 75% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us
the minimum amount you will sell this idea.
Scenario 3.

You have a venture idea which has a 25% chance to

get a $200,000 payoff and a 75% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us
the minimum amount you will sell this idea.
Scenario 4.

You have a venture idea which has a 25% chance to

get a $500,000 payoff and a 75% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us
the minimum amount you will sell this idea.
Scenario 5.

You have a venture idea which has a 25% chance to

get a $1,000,000 payoff and a 75% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us
the minimum amount you will sell this idea.
Scenario 6.

You have a venture idea which has a 50% chance to

get a $200,000 payoff and a 50% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us
the minimum amount you will sell this idea.
Scenario 7.

You have a venture idea which has a 75% chance to

get a $200,000 payoff and a 25% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us
the minimum amount you will sell this idea.
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Scenario 8.

You have a venture idea which has a 95% chance to

get a $200,000 payoff and a 5% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the
minimum amount you will sell this idea.

Manipulation check
I used two 7-point Likert Scale questions to check the manipulation of different
styles of thinking. I list them below.
Please indicate that how you evaluate the above venture ideas:
I made my decision fast, intuitively and unconsciously.
I made my decision slowly, analytically and consciously.

Appendix C shows a sample of the survey.
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CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Chapter Overview
I ran three different models to test my hypotheses. First, I ran a model that included
all samples to test the moderation effects of entrepreneur, different types of frames, and
different styles of thinking. Second, I ran a model that only included non-entrepreneurs and
nascent entrepreneurs to test the difference between them. Third, I ran a model that only
includes entrepreneurs to test the moderation effect of their entrepreneurial experience.
Data
I sent my survey through Qualtics.com. Qualtrics is a world leading survey
technology provider. They sent the survey to entrepreneurs and general population.
Entrepreneurs are those who have started at least one business and are currently running a
business. General population is American Adult. There were 277 people who participated
in the survey. There were 130 entrepreneurs and 147 non-entrepreneurs. I checked whether
participants entered valid data based on three rules. First, some participants finished the
survey in an unreasonably short time. The average time of completion for this survey was
13 minutes. I treated the participants as invalid if they finished survey within five minutes.
Second, some participants consistently entered same numbers for the evaluations. There
were four questions of evaluations on each screen when the participant took the survey.
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Therefore, I treated the participants as invalid if they entered same numbers for more than
four evaluations. Third, some participants entered non-sensible answers. These
respondents just did not seem to make sense in their answers to my questions. They
included percentage, etc. in response to questions of evaluations. Among all participants,
184 people provided valid data. There were 101 entrepreneurs and 83 non-entrepreneurs.
To further check the validity of participants, I checked the correlations between
their evaluations of gain frames and loss frames. The mean of their reliability is .60, the
median is .72, and the standard deviation is .40. I used .50 as a threshold of reliability to
screen out the participants who have low reliabilities (Holland & Shepherd, 2013). There
were 125 participants who had reliabilities greater than .50. There were 66 entrepreneurs
and 59 non-entrepreneurs. Table 4 shows the demographic description of the data.
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Table 4
Demographic Description
Entrepreneur Yes
No
Gender
Male
Female
Race
White/Caucasian
African American
Hispanic
Asian
Native American
Other
Education
Less than High School
High School / GED
Some College
2-year College Degree
4-year College Degree
Master Degree
Doctoral Degree
Professional Degree (JD, MD)

Full sample
f
%
130 46.9
147 53.1
125 45.1
152 54.9
189 68.2
39 14.1
24
8.7
13
4.7
4
1.4
8
2.9
8
2.9
54 19.5
89 32.1
33 11.9
69 24.9
17
6.1
3
1.1
4
1.4

Valid data Reliable data
f
%
f
%
101 54.9
66
52.8
83 45.1
59
47.2
85 46.2
59
47.2
99 53.8
66
52.8
127 69.0
95
76.0
24 13.0
13
10.4
20 10.9
11
8.8
5
2.7
4
3.2
2
1.6
1
0.8
5
2.7
1
0.8
5
2.7
4
3.2
37 20.1
24
19.2
58 31.5
41
32.8
18
9.8
13
10.4
50 27.2
34
27.2
12
6.5
7
5.6
3
1.6
1
0.8
1
0.5
1
0.8

HLM Model 1: Entrepreneurs vs. Non-Entrepreneurs
Because decisions are nested within entrepreneurs, I used HLM 7 (Raudenbush,
Bryk, Cheong, Congdon, & du Toit, 2011) to test my hypotheses. HLM has several merits
in multi-level analysis. First, I can determine whether OLS regression’s independence of
responses assumption is violated to see if I need to use a multi-level model. Second, I can
examine the effect of controls prior to entering hypothesized variables. Third, I can
calculate the percent of variance explained by the controls, direct effects, and moderators
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). To linearize the model, I used the natural logarithm function.
Therefore,
𝐿𝑛𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
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𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒(𝑥) = 𝑎 ln 𝑥
𝑝𝜔

𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑝) = ln

1

(𝑝𝜔 + (1 − 𝑝)𝜔 )𝜔
Based on the experimental results of Tversky and Kahneman (1992), here 𝑎 =
0.88, 𝜔 = 0.66, 𝑥 = 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒, 𝑝 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦.
Table 5 shows the HLM variables. There are two types of methods in HLM based
on different types of likelihood of analysis: restricted maximum likelihood (REML) and
full maximum likelihood (FIML). In practice, both methods lead to similar results (Kreft,
De Leeuw, & Kim, 1990). However, if the number of level-2 groups is small, FIML has a
downward bias, which estimates for variance components tend to be smaller than the
REML estimates (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Because the number of level-2 groups of
my data was bigger than 30, I used FIML to analyze the models. There were 1,914
evaluations nested within 125 individuals. Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics and
correlations of HLM Model 1.
First, I ran a null model that only includes the dependent variable and does not
include any independent variables. The intra-class correlation (ICC) is 68.0%. That is, 68.0%
of variance of subjective values can be explained by the difference among individuals.
Therefore, it is appropriate to use a multi-level model to analyze the data. Table 7 shows
the HLM results of Model 1.
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Table 5
HLM Variables
Variable
Level-1 variables
LnEvaluation
LnSubOutcome
LnSubProbability
Frame

Coding

Centering

Monetary
Monetary
Percent
0: Loss frame
1: Gain frame

Frame*LnSubOut
Frame*LnSubPr
Level-2 variables
Age
Gender

Variable type

Grand centered
Grand centered
Uncentered

DV
IV
IV
M(H1)

Grand centered
Grand centered

M(H1)
M(H1)

Years
Grand centered
CV
0: Female
Uncentered
CV
1: Male
System
0: System 1
Uncentered
M(H2)
1: System 2
Entrepreneur
0: Other
Uncentered
M(H3)
1: Entrepreneur
Nascent
0: Other
Uncentered
M(H4)
entrepreneur
1: Nascent entrepreneur
Experience
Years
Grand centered
M(H5)
Note. DV = Dependent variable, IV = Independent variable, CV = Control variable,
M = Moderator, and H = Hypothesis.
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Table 6
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Model 1
Mean SD
Correlations
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 8
9
1 LnEvaluation
9.665 2.636
1
2 LnSubOutcome 10.945 0.581 .150***
1
***
3 LnSubProbability -1.052 0.538 .242 -.113***
1
**
4 Frame
0.496 0.500 -.054
.001
.004
1
***
5 Entrepreneur
0.488 0.500 -.133 -.003
.009
-.012
1
**
6 System
0.426 0.495 .077 -.005
.000
-.010 .043
1
***
7 Age
37.983 15.408 -.159 -.002
.012
.005 -.001 -.015
1
***
**
**
8 Gender
0.471 0.500 -.096
.003 -.007
.006 -.073 -.073 .016
1
***
***
***
9 Frame*LnSubOut 0.003 0.409 .105
.703 -.081
.007 -.005 -.002 .000 .003
1
***
***
***
10 Frame*LnSubPr 0.005 0.380 .168 -.081
.703
.001 .013 .004 .007 -.004 -.115***
*

p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
N = 1,914.

Table 7
HLM Results of Model 1
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Null model
Level-1 IV model
Control model
Final model
Fixed effects
Coefficient (SE)
Cohen’s d Effect size
LnEvaluation, β0
Intercept, γ00
9.65(0.20)***
9.62(0.20)***
9.63(0.20)***
10.02(0.32)***
*
Age, γ01
-0.03(0.01)
-0.03(0.01)*
.01 Very small
Entrepreneur, γ02
-0.78(0.39)*
.30 Small
System, γ03
0.34(0.39)
For LnSubOutcome slope, β1
Intercept, γ10
0.85(0.06)***
0.84(0.06)***
0.78(0.09)***
.29 Very small
#
Age, γ11
-0.01(0.00)
-0.01(0.00)*
.00 Very small
Entrepreneur, γ12
-0.05(0.11)
System, γ13
0.22(0.11)*
.08 Very small
For LnSubProbability slope, β2
Intercept, γ20
1.42(0.09)***
1.42(0.09)***
1.45(0.15)***
.55 Medium
Entrepreneur, γ21
-0.09(0.19)
System, γ22
0.13(0.19)
For Frame slope, β3
Intercept, γ30
-0.34(0.12)**
.13 Very small
Random effects
Variance component (SD)
LnEvaluation, u0
4.74(2.18)***
4.92(2.22)***
4.74(2.18)***
4.94(2.22)***
***
***
LnSubOutcome slope, u1
0.18(0.42)
0.16(0.40)
0.23(0.48)***
***
***
LnSubProbability slope, u2
0.83(0.91)
0.83(0.91)
0.95(0.98)***
Frame slope, u3
1.48(1.22)***
Level-1, r
2.24(1.50)
1.19(1.09)
1.09(1.09)
0.71(0.84)
Deviance
7416.21
6497.52
6569.57
5953.24
Estimated parameters
3
10
12
23
*
p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
Cohen’s d effect size scale: 0.00 to 0.29 = very small; 0.30 to 0.49 = small; 0.50 to 0.79 = medium; and over 0.80 = large (Cohen, 1988).

Second, I added the independent variables (LnSubOutcome and LnSubProbability)
into the model as level-1 variables. I let all level-2 variances be random. The results (see
Table 7) indicated that they are all statistically significant; therefore, I keep them random
in the model to get the Level-1 IV model.
Third, I built a conditional model by adding control variables (Age and Gender) to
the level-2 intercept and slopes. Then, I eliminated all statistically non-significant level-2
effects (p > .100) to get the final control model. As shown in Table 8, only Age significantly
influences the intercept of DV and the slope of LnSubOutcome.

Table 8
Trim Decisions of Control Variables of Model 1
Fixed effect
Coefficient Standard error p-value Trim decision
LnEvaluation, β0
Intercept, γ00
Age, γ01
Gender, γ02
For LnSubOutcome slope, β1
Intercept, γ10
Age, γ11
Gender, γ12
For LnSubProbability slope, β2
Intercept, γ20
Age, γ21
Gender, γ22

Fourth,

I

added

9.389
-0.027
0.508

0.269
0.012
0.391

<0.001
0.036
0.196

Kept
Removed

0.850
-0.007
-0.013

0.077
0.004
0.113

<0.001
0.062
0.910

Kept
Removed

1.335
-0.005
0.181

0.129
0.006
0.189

<0.001
0.403
0.341

Removed
Removed

level-1

moderators

(Frame,

Frame*LnSubOut,

and

Frame*LnSubPr) into the model as grand centered. I kept statistically significant
moderator in the model and removed statistically non-significant moderators. As shown in
Table 9, only Frame was statistically significant.
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Table 9
Trim Decisions of Level-1 Moderators of Model 1
Moderator
Coefficient
Standard error
Frame
-0.343
0.118
Frame*LnSubOut
-0.018
0.064
Frame*LnSubPr
-0.004
0.104

p-value
.004
.776
.972

Trim decision
Kept
Removed
Removed

Fifth, I tested my final model by adding the level-2 moderators (Entrepreneur and
System). I added Entrepreneur and System as predictors of the intercept and slopes
(LnSubOutcome and LnSubProbability). I calculated effect sizes of the final model by
using Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1988), 𝑑 =

𝛾
√𝜏00 +𝜎2

. The final model is as follows:

Level-1 Model
LnEvaluationij = β0j + β1j*(LnSubOutcomeij) + β2j*(LnSubProbabilityij) +
β3j*(Frameij) + rij
Level-2 Model
β0j = γ00 + γ01*(Agej) + γ01*(Entrepreneurj) + γ03*(Systemj) + u0j
β1j = γ10 + γ11*(Agej) + γ12*(Entrepreneurj) + γ13*(Systemj) + u1j
β2j = γ20 + γ21*(Entrepreneurj) + γ22*(Systemj) + u2j
β3j = γ30 + u3j

The HLM results for the final model (see Table 7) indicate that the Frame has a
moderate effect on the dependent variable. That is, the average natural logarithm of
subjective evaluations of gain frame is 0.34 less than that of loss frame. Therefore, H1a is
supported, that is the Frame moderates the relationship between the opportunity and the
subjective value of the opportunity. The Cohen’s d (1988) of this moderating effect is very
small. The System has a moderating effect on the slope of LnSubOutcome. That is, the slope
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of nature logarithm of subjective outcome is 0.22 greater when participants use more
System 2 thinking than when participants use more System 1 thinking. Therefore, H2b is
supported, that is the type of thinking moderates the relationship between the opportunity
and the subjective value of the opportunity. The Cohen’s d (1988) of this moderating effect
is very small. The Entrepreneur has a direct effect on the intercept of dependent variable,
LnEvaluation. That is, the average nature logarithm of subjective evaluations of
entrepreneurs is 0.78 smaller than that of non-entrepreneurs when everything else is equal.
Therefore, the H3a is supported, that is non-entreprepeurs have higher subjective
evaluations of opportunities than entrepreneurs. The Cohen’s d (1988) of this moderating
effect is small. There is no moderation effect on the slope of LnSubProbability for
entrepreneurs or for differing systems (see Table 7).
The results show that entrepreneurs have lower evaluations than non-entrepreneurs.
Figure 8 shows the means of evaluations of each scenario. Most of the evaluations are
lower than the expected values. Therefore, the evaluations of entrepreneurs are lower than
non-entrepreneurs means that the evaluations of entrepreneurs are more divergent from the
expected values.
The results show that the different types of thinking influence the subjective values
of outcomes. People’s subjective values of outcomes are higher when they use more
System 2 thinking than when they use more System 1 thinking. That is, people will evaluate
opportunities close to the expected values when they use more System 2 thinking. This
result is consistent with dual-process theory.
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The results show that people’s evaluations of gain frame are lower than those of
loss frame. That is, people overweight the losses. This result is consistent with prospect
theory.

Means of Evaluations
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Entrepreneur

Figure 8
Means of evaluations
HLM Model 2: Nascent Entrepreneurs vs. Non-Entrepreneurs
In model 2, I only included non-entrepreneurs and nascent entrepreneurs. There
were 63 non-entrepreneurs who completed 981 evaluations and 14 nascent entrepreneurs
who completed 217 evaluations. Totally 217 individuals completed 1198 evaluations. I
used the same HLM variables shown in Table 5. Table 10 shows descriptive statistics and
correlations.
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First, I ran a null model that only includes dependent variable and does not include
any independent variables. The ICC is 60.3%. That is, 60.3% of variance of subjective
values can be explained by the difference among individuals. Therefore, it is appropriate
to use a multi-level model to analyze the data.
Second, I added the independent variables (LnSubOutcome and LnSubProbability)
into the model as level-1 variables. I let all level-2 variances be random. The results (see
Table 11) indicated that they are all statistically significant; therefore, I kept them random
in the model.

61

62

Table 10
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Model 2
Mean
SD
1
1 LnEvaluation
9.857 2.387
1
2 LnSubOutcome
10.946 0.584 .174***
3 LnSubProbabilty
-1.056 0.536 .281***
4 Frame
0.498 0.500 -.065*
5 Nascent
0.181 0.385 -.135***
6 System
0.434 0.496 .158***
7 Age
37.258 15.295 -.103***
8 Gender
0.455 0.498 -.161***
9 Frame*LnSubOut
0.004
.413 .115***
10 Frame*LnSubPr
-0.003
.379 .199***
*

p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
N = 1,198.

2

3

Correlations
4
5

1
-.111***
1
-.003
.000
1
-.003
.000
-.014
-.009
-.012
-.007
.000
.009
.009
.000
-.012
.005
***
**
.707
-.079
.009
**
***
-.079
.707
-.008

1
.122***
-.102***
-.221***
-.004
.007

6

7

1
-.010
1
***
-.113
.036
-.006
-.001
-.006
.005

8

9

1
.001
1
-.006 -.111***

Table 11
HLM Results of Model 2
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Null model
Level-1 IV model
Control model
Final model
Fixed effects
Coefficient (SE)
Cohen’s d Effect size
LnEvaluation, β0
Intercept, γ00
9.85(0.22)***
9.84(0.22)***
9.53(0.27)***
9.59(0.33)***
Gender, γ01
0.69(0.35)
0.52(0.35)
Nascent, γ02
-0.74(0.55)**
.31
Small
System, γ03
0.75(0.42)
For LnSubOutcome slope, β1
Intercept, γ10
0.87(0.07)***
0.85(0.06)***
0.71(0.09)***
.30
Small
Nascent, γ11
0.11(0.16)
System, γ12
0.34(0.13)*
.14
Very small
For LnSubProbability slope, β2
Intercept, γ20
1.45(0.12)***
1.43(0.09)***
1.42(0.17)***
.60
Medium
Nascent, γ21
-0.26(0.31)
System, γ22
0.22(0.25)
For Frame slope, β3
Intercept, γ30
-0.35(0.14)**
.15
Very small
Random effects
Variance component (SD)
LnEvaluation, u0
3.43(1.85)***
3.57(1.89)***
3.42(1.85)***
3.38(1.84)***
LnSubOutcome slope, u1
0.14(0.37)***
0.14(0.37)***
0.16(0.41)***
***
***
LnSubProbability slope, u2
0.87(0.93)
0.87(0.93)
0.98(0.99)***
Frame slope, u3
1.21(1.10)***
Level-1, r
2.26(1.50)
1.16(1.08)
1.16(1.08)
0.76(0.87)
Deviance
4621.74
3995.74
3991.96
3714.53
Estimated parameters
3
10
11
22
*
p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
Cohen’s d effect size scale: 0.00 to 0.29 = very small; 0.30 to 0.49 = small; 0.50 to 0.79 = medium; and over 0.80 = large (Cohen, 1988).

Third, I built a conditional model by adding control variables (Age and Gender) to
the model to predict the intercept and slopes. Then, I eliminated all statistically nonsignificant level-2 effects (p > .100) to get the final control model (see Table 12). The
results indicate that only Gender significantly influences the intercept of DV (see Table
12).

Table 12
Trim Decisions of Control Variables of Model 2
Fixed effect
Coefficient Standard error p-value Trim decision
LnEvaluation, β0
Intercept, γ00
Age, γ01
Gender, γ02
For LnSubOutcome slope, β1
Intercept, γ10
Age, γ11
Gender, γ12
For LnSubProbability slope, β2
Intercept, γ20
Age, γ21
Gender, γ22

Fourth,

I

added

9.475
-0.019
0.805

0.285
0.014
0.423

<0.001
0.180
0.061

Removed
Kept

0.813
-0.005
0.125

0.092
0.004
0.136

<0.001
0.255
0.359

Removed
Removed

1.363
-0.011
0.182

0.162
0.008
0.241

<0.001
0.168
0.451

Removed
Removed

level-1

moderators

(Frame,

Frame*LnSubOut,

and

Frame*LnSubPr) into the model as grand centered. I kept statistically significant
moderator in the model and removed statistically non-significant moderators. As shown in
Table 13, only Frame was statistically significant.

Table 13
Trim Decisions of Level-1 Moderators of Model 2
Moderator
Coefficient
Standard error
Frame
-0.354
0.137
Frame*LnSubOut
-0.080
0.087
Frame*LnSubPr
0.032
0.127
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p-value
.011
.362
.805

Trim decision
Kept
Removed
Removed

Fifth, I tested my final model by adding the level-2 moderators (Nascent and
System). I added Nascent and System as predictors of the intercept and slopes
(LnSubOutcome and LnSubProbability). I calculated effect sizes of the final model by
using Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1988), 𝑑 =

𝛾
√𝜏00 +𝜎2

. The final model is as follows:

Level-1 Model
LnEvaluationij = β0j + β1j*(LnSubOutcomeij) + β2j*(LnSubProbabilityij) +
β3j*(Frameij) + rij
Level-2 Model
β0j = γ00 + γ01*(Genderj) + γ02*(Nascentj) + γ03*(Systemj) + u0j
β1j = γ10 + γ11*(Nascentj) + γ12*(Systemj) + u1j
β2j = γ20 + γ21*(Nascentj) + γ22*(Systemj) + u2j
β3j = γ30 + u3j

The HLM results for this final model (see Table 11) indicate that Nascent has a
statistically significant relationship with the intercept of dependent variable, LnEvaluation.
That is, the average LnEvaluation of nascent entrepreneurs is 0.74 smaller than that of nonentrepreneurs when everything else is equal. The Cohen’s d (1988) of this moderating
effect is small. The System has a moderate effect on the slope of LnSubOutcome. That is,
the slope of LnSubOutcome is 0.34 bigger when participants use more System 2 thinking
than when participants use more System 1 thinking. The Cohen’s d (1988) of this
moderating effect is very small. There is no moderation effect on the slope of
LnSubProbability. The Frame has a moderate effect on the dependent variable. That is, the
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average LnEvaluation of gain frame is 0.35 smaller than that of loss frame. The Cohen’s d
(1988) of this moderating effect is very small.
The results of Model 2 show that nascent entrepreneurs have lower evaluations than
non-entrepreneurs. Because of most evaluations are lower than the expected values, the
evaluations of nascent entrepreneurs are lower than non-entrepreneurs means that the
evaluations of nascent entrepreneurs are farther divergent from the expected values.
The results show that the different types of thinking influence the subjective values
of outcomes. People’s subjective values of outcomes are higher when they use more
System 2 thinking than when they use more System 1 thinking. That is, people will have
evaluations that are closer to the expected values when they use more System 2 thinking.
This result is consistent with dual-process theory.
The results show that people’s evaluations of gain frame are lower than those of
loss frame. That is, people overweight the losses. This result is consistent with prospect
theory.
Consequently, the results of HLM model 2 are similar with the results of HLM
model 1, which support that the difference of decision making between entrepreneurs and
non-entrepreneurs also exists between nascent entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs.

HLM Model 3: Entrepreneurs
In model 3, I only included entrepreneur samples. There were 62 entrepreneurs who
completed 933 evaluations. In this model, I tested whether the cognitive differences I found
in HLM model 1 due to the acquired attribute of entrepreneurial practice. Therefore, I used
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Experience as a moderator and grand-mean centered it. I used the same HLM variables
shown in Table 5. Table 14 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations.
First, I ran a null model that only includes dependent variable and does not include
any independent variables. The ICC is 73.8%. That is, 73.8% of variance of subjective
values can be explained by the difference among individuals. Therefore, it is appropriate
to use a multi-level model to analyze the data. Table 15 shows the HLM results.
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Table 14
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Model 3
Mean SD
1
2
3
1 LnEvaluation
9.305 2.994
1
2 LnSubOutcome
10.943 0.578 .130***
1
***
3 LnSubProbabilty
-1.046 0.542 .202 -.115***
1
*
4 Frame
0.490 0.500 -.069 -.002
.014
***
5 Experience
6.185 4.736 -.142 -.004
.017
6 System
0.448 0.498 .009
.000
.015
***
7 Age
37.971 15.147 -.246 -.003
.014
8 Gender
0.434 0.496 -.049
.006
.000
**
***
9 Frame*LnSubOut
0.001 0.402 .093
.695 -.084 **
10 Frame*LnSubPr
0.006 0.380 .142*** -.084* .701 ***
*

p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
N = 1,005.

Correlations
4
5

1
.001
-.016
.001
.011
.002
.015

6

7

8

9

1
-.100**
1
***
.552
-.088**
1
*
.149
-.002 -.012
1
-.001
.003
.001 .007
1
.011
.015
.007 -.004 -.120***

Table 15
HLM Results of Model 3
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Fixed effects
LnEvaluation, β0
Intercept, γ00
Age, γ01
Experience, γ02
System, γ03
For LnSubOutcome slope, β1
Intercept, γ10
Age, γ11
Experience, γ12
System, γ13
For LnSubProbability slope, β2
Intercept, γ20
Experience, γ21
System, γ22
For Frame slope, β3
Intercept, γ30
Random effects
LnEvaluation, u0
LnSubOutcome slope, u1
LnSubProbability slope, u2
Frame slope, u3
Level-1, r
Deviance
Estimated parameters
*
p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Null model
9.30(0.33)***

6.60(2.57)

***

2.34(1.63)
3672.12
3

Level-1 IV model
Control model
Coefficient (SE)

Final model

9.26(0.33)***

9.26(0.32)***
-0.04(0.02) *

9.57(0.45)***
-0.04(0.03)
-0.01(0.08)
-0.23(0.65)

0.84(0.09)***

0.83(0.08)***
-0.01(0.00)

0.77(0.12)***
-0.00(0.02)
-0.02(0.02)
0.13(0.17)

1.37(0.12)***

1.37(0.12)***

1.34(0.17)***
-0.00(0.03)
0.21(0.25)

Variance component (SD)
6.76(2.60)***
6.28(2.51)***
***
0.18(0.42)
0.14(0.38)**
***
0.60(0.77)
0.60(0.77)***
1.39(1.18)
3306.00
10

1.39(1.18)
3299.82
12

-0.51(0.19)**
7.04(2.65)***
0.32(0.57)***
0.80(0.90)***
2.16(1.46)***
0.64(0.80)
2881.29
23

Second, I added independent variables (LnSubOutcome and LnSubProbability) into
the model as level-1 variables. I let all level-2 variances be random. The results (see Table
15) indicated that they are all statistically significant. Therefore, I kept them random in the
model.
Third, I built a conditional model by adding control variables (Age and Gender) to
level-2 intercept and slopes. Then, I eliminated all statistically non-significant level-2
effects (p > .100) to get the final control model (see Table 16). The results indicate that
Age is significantly influences the intercept of LnEvaluation and slope of LnSubOutcome
(see Table 16).

Table 16
Trim Decisions of Control Variables of Model 3
Fixed effect
Coefficient Standard error p-value Trim decision
LnEvaluation, β0
Intercept, γ00
Age, γ01
Gender, γ02
For LnSubOutcome slope, β1
Intercept, γ10
Age, γ11
Gender, γ12
For LnSubProbability slope, β2
Intercept, γ20
Age, γ21
Gender, γ22

9.144
-0.045
0.265

0.427
0.021
0.646

<0.001
0.038
0.683

Kept
Removed

0.935
-0.010
-0.229

0.110
0.005
0.167

<0.001
0.069
0.175

Kept
Removed

1.286
0.002
0.184

0.163
0.008
0.248

<0.001
0.784
0.462

Removed
Removed

Fourth, I added level-1 moderators (Frame, Frame*LnSubOutcome, and
Frame*LnSubProbability) into the model as grand centered. I kept statistically significant
moderator in the model and removed statistically non-significant moderators. As shown in
Table 17, only Frame was statistically significant.
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Table 17
Trim Decisions of Level-1 Moderators of Model 3
Moderator
Coefficient
Standard error
Frame
-0.501
0.198
Frame*LnSubOut
0.048
0.111
Frame*LnSubPr
0.062
0.165

p-value
.014
.659
.707

Trim decision
Kept
Removed
Removed

I added Experience (grand centered) and System (uncentered) to the level 2
intercept and slopes (LnSubOutcome and LnSubProbability). However, none of them was
significant (see Table 15). The final model shows as following:

Level-1 Model
LnEvaluationij = β0j + β1j*(LnSubOutcomeij) + β2j*(LnSubProbabilityij) +
β3j*(Frameij) + rij
Level-2 Model
β0j = γ00 + γ01*(Agej) + γ02*(Experiencej) + γ03*(Systemj) + u0j
β1j = γ10 + γ11*(Agej) + γ12*(Experiencej) + γ13*(Systemj) + u1j
β2j = γ20 + γ21*(Experiencej) + γ22*(Systemj) + u2j
β3j = γ30 + u3j

The results indicate that the moderation effects I find in HLM model 1 and HLM
model 2 are not statistically significant in HLM model 3 (see Table 7, Table 11, and Table
15). That means there is no statistically significant difference among entrepreneurs.
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Entrepreneurial experience has no statistically significant effect on entrepreneurs’
evaluations of opportunities. Consequently, H4 is supported, however, H5 is not supported.
That is, the cognitive differences in decision-making between entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurs are more likely due to the natural proclivities of entrepreneurs themselves,
based on these findings, rather than being due to attributes acquired from entrepreneurial
practice.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Conclusion
The reasons that people become entrepreneurs are still not clear in entrepreneurship
research (Lu & Tao, 2010; Sørensen & Fassiotto, 2011). It is an important question in
entrepreneurship. If we knew the reasons that people become entrepreneurs, we could
identify them ex ante from the general population, and we can better understand the logic
of entrepreneurial decision-making.
This dissertation addresses this question by decomposing it into two related
questions. First, do entrepreneurs make different decision compared to non-entrepreneurs
when they are facing the same opportunities under risk? Second, are these differences in
decision-making due to the natural proclivity of entrepreneurs or due to the attributes
acquired from entrepreneurial practice?
Scholars have examined entrepreneurial decision-making from different
perspectives. Scholars also argue that the entrepreneurial-decision-making research should
focus on the nexus between entrepreneurs and opportunities (Alvarez et al., 2013; Grégoire
& Shepherd, 2012; Sarasvathy, Dew, Velamuri, & Venkataraman, 2010; Shane, 2012).
However, early research of entrepreneurial decision-making only identified very few
limited systematic differences between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs (Busenitz &
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Barney, 1997). Recently scholars have achieved some progress in cognitive thinking
(Blume & Covin, 2011; Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Kickul et al., 2009). However, there is
an issue in existing research. Scholars only study the nexus from one side, either from
entrepreneur side or from opportunity side. Therefore, it is important to study the nexus
between entrepreneurs and opportunities from both aspects simultaneously.
This dissertation addresses the differences in entrepreneurial decision-making
between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs by focusing on the nexus between
entrepreneurs and opportunities. Based on dual-process theory, I examined how different
styles of thinking of entrepreneurs influence their decision-making. Based on prospect
theory, I examined how different types of framing of opportunities influence
entrepreneurial decision-making.
This dissertation also addresses whether the differences in decision-making
between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs are due to the natural proclivity of some
entrepreneurs or due to entrepreneurial practice. If the differences are due to the natural
proclivity of some entrepreneurs, we should observe these differences between
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, however, not between nascent entrepreneurs and
experienced entrepreneurs. On the other side, if the differences learned or acquired during
or from entrepreneurial practice, we should observe these differences between nascent
entrepreneurs and experienced entrepreneurs and between non-entrepreneurs and
experienced entrepreneurs. We should observe no differences between non-entrepreneurs
and nascent entrepreneurs.
The results of HLM model 1 indicate that both entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs
tend to over-weight the opportunities that have small probabilities and to under-weight the
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opportunities that have medium and large probabilities. This finding is consistent with
prospect theory.
The results of HLM model 1 indicate that different types of framing of opportunities
influence entrepreneurial decision-making. Specifically, the evaluations of opportunities
in loss frame are higher than the evaluations of opportunities in gain frame. However, my
results provide insufficient evidence that different types of framing of opportunities
influence the value function or the weighting function.
The results of HLM model 1 indicate that different styles of thinking of
entrepreneurs influence the value function. Specifically, the subjective values of outcomes
are higher when people use more System 2 thinking than System 1 thinking. However, my
results provide insufficient evidence that different styles of thinking influence the
weighting function.
The results of HLM model 1 indicate that entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs
make different decisions. Specifically, the evaluations of opportunities are lower for
entrepreneurs than for non-entrepreneurs. However, my results provide insufficient
evidence that entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs are different in their value function or
weighting function.
The results of HLM model 2 indicate that the same differences also exist between
nascent entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. However, my results provide no evidence
that these differences exist among entrepreneurs when I used entrepreneurial experience as
the moderator in HLM model 3. Therefore, based on my findings, these differences are
more likely to predate people becoming entrepreneurs. In other words, these differences
are more likely due to the natural proclivity of some entrepreneurs rather than being
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acquired or learned from entrepreneurial practice. At minimum, we can say that however
these differences were acquired before becoming an entrepreneur.
In summary, the style of thinking and the type of framing both influence
entrepreneurial decision-making. If people use more System 1 thinking, they tend to
generate higher subjective evaluations of opportunities. If people face opportunities in loss
frame, they tend to generate higher subjective evaluations of opportunities. Furthermore,
entrepreneurs tend to generate lower subjective evaluations than non-entrepreneurs do,
which is more likely due to the natural proclivity of entrepreneurs.
Contributions
This study contributes to the literature theoretically and practically in several ways.
First, this research is the first study to investigate the nexus between entrepreneurs and
opportunities as it relates to entrepreneurial decision making. Including both aspects is
important because entrepreneurial decision-making occurs at and often incorporates or is
affected by both entrepreneurs and opportunities (Alvarez & Barney, 2014; Shane, 2012;
Venkataraman, Sarasvathy, Dew, & Forster, 2012). The results of this study indicate that
both entrepreneurs’ thinking style and opportunity framing can influence entrepreneurial
decision-making. Second, this study provides evidence in support of the application of
prospect theory to research on entrepreneurial decision-making. Prospect theory argues
that the framing influences decision-making (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1992). In particular, entrepreneurs evaluate opportunities differently when the
opportunities are described in different framings. Next, this study also provides evidence
in support of the application of dual-process theory to research on entrepreneurship
decision-making. Dual-process theory indicates that the style of thinking influences
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decision making (Evans, 2008; Salas et al., 2010). In particular, entrepreneurs’ evaluations
of opportunities are higher when they use more System 2 thinking. Furthermore, this study
provides a possible way to investigate the reasons that people become entrepreneurs.
Scholars have identified some cognitive differences between entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurs (Baron, 1998; Haynie, Shepherd, & Patzelt, 2012). However, it is difficult
to prove whether these differences were due to the natural proclivity of some entrepreneurs
or were acquired from entrepreneurial practice. This study improves our understanding of
this question by testing the cognitive differences in two perspectives. One is between nonentrepreneurs and nascent entrepreneurs and the other is between nascent entrepreneurs
and experienced entrepreneurs. If the differences are due to the natural proclivity of
entrepreneurs, we should observe significant differences between non-entrepreneurs and
nascent entrepreneurs. On the other hand, if the differences were acquiring from
entrepreneurial practice, we should observe the moderation effect of entrepreneurial
experience. The results show that there are significant differences between nonentrepreneurs and nascent entrepreneurs and that there is no moderation effect from
entrepreneurial experience. Therefore, these cognitive differences between entrepreneurs
and non-entrepreneurs are more likely due to the natural proclivity of entrepreneurs.
Discussion
Regarding the unresolved questions that I mentioned at the beginning of this
dissertation, the findings of this dissertation advance our understanding of these questions.
The first unresolved question was about the quality of entrepreneurial decision-making: do
entrepreneurs make better decisions than non-entrepreneurs? According to the findings of
this dissertation, the answer is not always. Entrepreneurs have lower evaluations of
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opportunities than non-entrepreneurs (see Figure 8). The evaluations of both entrepreneurs
and non-entrepreneurs are higher than the expected values of the opportunities when the
probabilities of the opportunities are small. In this circumstance, evaluations of
entrepreneurs are closer to the expected value of the opportunities than those of nonentrepreneurs are. That is, entrepreneurs make better decisions. However, the evaluations
of both entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs are lower than the expected values of the
opportunities when the probabilities of the opportunities are medium and large. In this
circumstance, evaluations of non-entrepreneurs are closer to the expected value of the
opportunities than those of entrepreneurs are. That is, non-entrepreneurs make better
decisions.
The second unresolved question was about the difference between decision-making
by entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs: do entrepreneurs make different decisions than
non-entrepreneurs? By comparing the samples from entrepreneurs and general population,
I find entrepreneurs make different decisions than non-entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs have
lower evaluations of opportunities than non-entrepreneurs. This finding reveals that
entrepreneurs have lower evaluations than non-entrepreneurs when they are facing the
same opportunities. If so, then why did non-entrepreneurs not become entrepreneurs since
they had higher evaluations of opportunities? One possible reason is that the financial
return was not the only factor that influenced an entrepreneur’s decision to discover
opportunities. For example, scholars have found non-financial benefits and switching costs
may influence entrepreneurial opportunity discovery (Holland & Shepherd, 2013).
Because this study only investigated the influence of the outcome and probability, and not
possible motivating factors, it is a limitation of this research. However, other factors may
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also influence entrepreneurial opportunity discovery. Future research can further
investigate the influence of these other factors.
The third unresolved question was about whether these differences in decisionmaking were due to the natural proclivity of some entrepreneurs or were acquired from
entrepreneurial practice. The findings of this dissertation suggest one of the reasons that
entrepreneurs make different decisions than non-entrepreneurs is more likely due to
differences in the natural proclivity of entrepreneurs than due to the acquired attributes
from entrepreneurial practice. In other words, it appears that on average entrepreneurs and
non-entrepreneurs are different before they become entrepreneurs. Future research can
investigate how they are different. There are some possible aspects, such as entrepreneurial
passion (Cardon, Foo, Shepherd, & Wiklund, 2012; Cardon, Wincent, Singh, & Drnovsek,
2009), entrepreneurial persistence (Gimeno et al., 1997; Holland & Shepherd, 2013), and
entrepreneurial self-efficacy (McGee, Peterson, Mueller, & Sequeira, 2009; Tumasjan &
Braun, 2011). Being different also could motivate a very interesting conversation. There
are several perspectives that we could use to investigate this idea. For example, since
people become entrepreneurs are due to their natural proclivities, how can we identify these
natural proclivities ex ante? Can we nurture these natures by education? All these could be
very interesting future research.
There are other limitations in this dissertation. First, this study only investigates the
opportunities under risk. Entrepreneurs evaluated the opportunities under the situation that
they know all the outcomes and the probabilities of opportunities. However, not all
opportunities are risks for entrepreneurs. Because the complexity and uncertainty of the
environments in which entrepreneurs find themselves, some opportunities are uncertainties
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for entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs either do not know the outcome, or do not know the
probability. In other situations, entrepreneurs do not know either the outcomes or the
probabilities. Future studies can further investigate how entrepreneurs evaluate
opportunities under uncertainty. Second, it is unclear whether the behavior of
entrepreneurial decision-making is stable. Therefore, future longitudinal studies are
expected to improve our understanding of entrepreneurial decision-making.
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APPENDIX A

Definitions of Key Concepts
Concept
Decision weight
Diminishing sensitivity

Expected utility

Expected value
Experienced entrepreneurs
Framing
Framing of an opportunity
Gain frame
Loss aversion

Loss frame
Mixed gambles
Nascent entrepreneurs
Prospect

Definition
Depicts the influence of a probability on the value of a
gamble (Kahneman & Tversky1979).
The difference between the subjective values of two
outcomes is larger, the closer those outcomes are to the
reference point (Kahneman & Tversky1979).
The probability-weighted average of the utilities of a
gamble’s outcomes, where utility refers to the pleasure
the final wealth positions (i.e., current wealth plus the
outcome of the gamble) will provide (von Neumann &
Morgenstern, 1944).
The probability-weighted average of a gamble’s
outcomes (Edwards, 1954).
Entrepreneurs who have started a business more than one
year and/or started more than one business.
An individual’s interpretation of a decision (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1981).
An individual’s interpretation of an opportunity
Anticipating an outcome in excess of one’s reference
point (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
A tendency to prefer minimizing losses to maximizing
equivalent
magnitude
gains
(Kahneman
&
Tversky1979).
Anticipating an outcome below one’s reference point
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
Gambles that offer both positive and negative outcomes
(Kahneman & Tversky1979).
Entrepreneurs who are in the process of starting their first
businesses.
A contract that yields outcome 𝑥𝑖 with probability 𝑝𝑖 ,
where
𝑝1 + 𝑝2 + ⋯ + 𝑝𝑛 = 1
(Kahneman
&
Tversky1979).
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Pure gambles
Reference point

Risk

Risk aversion
Risk seeking
Styles of thinking
Subjective value

Value function

Gambles that offer strictly positive or strictly negative
outcomes (Kahneman & Tversky1979).
The neutral position used to determine the extent to
which outcomes constitute gains (which are above this
position) or losses (which are below this position)
(Kahneman & Tversky1979).
Situations in which both outcomes and their probabilities
of occurrence are known to the decision maker (Knight,
1921).
Preferring sure outcomes to probabilistic outcomes with
greater expected value (Kahneman & Tversky1979).
Preferring probabilistic outcomes to sure outcomes with
greater expected value (Kahneman & Tversky1979).
Use more System 1 or System 2 thinking.
Depicts the value an individual perceives an outcome to
be worth, reflecting the pleasure the outcome will
provide (Kahneman & Tversky1979).
Translates outcomes into subjective values (Kahneman
& Tversky1979).
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Ten Field Phenomena Inconsistent with EU and Consistent with Cumulative Prospect Theory (Camerer, 2004, p. 149)
Domain
Phenomenon
Description
Type of Data
Isolated
Ingredients
References
Decision
Stock market
Equity premium Stock returns are NYSE stock,
Single yearly
Loss-aversion
(Benartzi &
too high relative bond returns
return (not longThaler, 1995)
to bond returns
run)
Stock market
Disposition
Hold losing
Individual
Single stock (not Reflection effect (Odean, 1998)
effect
stocks too long,
investor trades
portfolio)
sell winners too
early
Labor economics DownwardNYC cabdrivers Cabdriver hours, Single day (not
Loss-aversion
(Camerer,
sloping labor
quit around daily earnings
week or month)
Babcock,
supply
income target
Loewenstein, &
Thaler, 1997)
Consumer goods Asymmetric
Purchases more
Product
Single product
Loss-aversion
(Hardie,
price elasticities sensitive to price purchases
(not shopping
Johnson, &
increases than to ( scanner data)
cart)
Fader, 1993)
cuts
Macroeconomics Insensitivity to
Consumers do
Teachers’
Single year
Loss-aversion,
(Shea, 1995),
bad income
not cut
earnings, savings
reflection effect (Bowman,
news
consumption
Minehart, &
after bad income
Rabin, 1999)
news
Consumer
Status quo bias,
Consumers do
Health plan,
Single choice
Loss-aversion
(Samuelson &
choice
Default bias
not switch health insurance
Zeckhauser,
choices
1988), (Johnson,

plans, choose
default insurance

97

Horse race
betting

Favoritelongshot bias

Horse race
betting

End-of-the-day
effect

Insurance

Buying phone
wire insurance

Lottery betting

Demand for
Lotto

Favorites are
underbet,
longshots
overbet
Shift to
longshots at the
end of the day
Consumers buy
overpriced
insurance
More tickets
sold as top prize
rises

Hershey,
Meszaros, &
Kunreuther,
1993)
(Jullien &
Salanié, 2000)

Track odds

Single race (not
day)

Overweight low
p(loss)

Track odds

Single day

Reflection effect

(McGlothlin,
1956)

Phone wire
insurance
purchases
State lottery
sales

Single wire risk
(not portfolio)

Overweight low
p(loss)

(Cicchetti &
Dubin, 1994)

Single lottery

Overweight low
p(win)

(Cook &
Clotfelter,
1993)

APPENDIX C

A SAMPLE OF SURVEY
Dear Participate:

You are being invited to participate in a research study by

answering the attached survey about entrepreneurial decision-making. There are no known
risks for your participation in this research study. The information collected may not
benefit you directly. The information learned in this study may be helpful to others. The
information you provide will help us to understand how entrepreneurs make
decisions. Your completed survey will be stored at University of Louisville. The survey
will take approximately 15 minutes to complete.
Individuals from the Department of Entrepreneurship, the Institutional Review
Board (IRB), the Human Subjects Protection Program Office (HSPPO), and other
regulatory agencies may inspect these records. In all other respects, however, the data will
be held in confidence to the extent permitted by law. Should the data be published, your
identity will not be disclosed.
Taking part in this study is voluntary. By completing this survey you agree to take
part in this research study. You do not have to answer any questions that make you
uncomfortable. You may choose not to take part at all. If you decide to be in this study you
may stop taking part at any time. If you decide not to be in this study or if you stop taking
part at any time, you will not lose any benefits for which you may qualify.
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If you have any questions, concerns, or complaints about the research study, please
contact: Dalong Ma, 502 939 9681, dalong.ma@louisville.edu.
If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, you may call the
Human Subjects Protection Program Office at (502) 852-5188. You can discuss any
questions about your rights as a research subject, in private, with a member of the
Institutional Review Board (IRB). You may also call this number if you have other
questions about the research, and you cannot reach the research staff, or want to talk to
someone else. The IRB is an independent committee made up of people from the University
community, staff of the institutions, as well as people from the community not connected
with these institutions. The IRB has reviewed this research study.
If you have concerns or complaints about the research or research staff and you do
not wish to give your name, you may call 1-877-852-1167. This is a 24 hour hot line
answered by people who do not work at the University of Louisville.

Sincerely,
Dalong Ma
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Are you currently running a business?
 Yes (1)
 No (2)

Please base your answers to the following questions on the feelings you experience.

When you hear the name "George Clooney", what do you feel? Please use one word to
describe your predominant feeling:

When you hear the name "George W. Bush", what do you feel? Please use one word to
describe your predominant feeling:

When you hear the name "Princess Diana", what do you feel?

Please use one word to

describe your predominant feeling:

When you hear the name "9/11", what do you feel? Please use one word to describe your
predominant feeling:

When you hear the name "baby", what do you feel? Please use one word to describe your
predominant feeling:

100

Please work carefully and deliberately to calculate the answers to the questions posed
below.

If an object travels at five feet per minute, then by your calculations how many feet will it
travel in 360 seconds?

Suppose a student bought a pen and a pencil for a total of $11, and that the pen cost $10
more than the pencil. Then, by your calculations how much did the pencil cost?

If a consumer bought 30 books for $540, then, by your calculations, on average, how much
did the consumer pay for each book?

If a baker bought nine pounds of flour at $1.50 per pound, then, by your calculations how
much did the baker pay in total?

If a company bought 15 computers for $1200 each, then, by your calculations, how much
did the company pay in total?
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There is a venture idea which has a 75% chance to earn a $200,000 payoff and a 25%
chance to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea.

There is a venture idea which has a 25% chance to earn a $100,000 payoff and a 75%
chance to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea.

There is a venture idea which has a 25% chance to earn a $200,000 payoff and a 75%
chance to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea.

There is a venture idea which has a 5% chance to earn a $200,000 payoff and a 95% chance
to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea.
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There is a venture idea which has a 25% chance to earn a $1,000,000 payoff and a 75%
chance to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea.

There is a venture idea which has a 95% chance to earn a $200,000 payoff and a 5% chance
to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea.

There is a venture idea which has a 50% chance to earn a $200,000 payoff and a 5% chance
to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea.

There is a venture idea which has a 25% chance to earn a $500,000 payoff and a 75%
chance to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the maximum amount you will pay to buy this
idea.
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There is a venture idea which has a 50% chance to earn a $200,000 payoff and a 50%
chance to lose money, but the amount of loss is unknown. Please tell us the maximum
amount you will pay to buy this idea.
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You have a venture idea which has a 75% chance to get a $200,000 payoff and a 25%
chance to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the minimum amount you will accept to sell this
idea.

You have a venture idea which has a 25% chance to get a $100,000 payoff and a 75%
chance to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the minimum amount you will accept to sell this
idea.

You have a venture idea which has a 25% chance to get a $200,000 payoff and a 75%
chance to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the minimum amount you will accept to sell this
idea.

You have a venture idea which has a 5% chance to get a $200,000 payoff and a 95% chance
to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the minimum amount you will accept to sell this idea.
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You have a venture idea which has a 25% chance to get a $1,000,000 payoff and a 75%
chance to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the minimum amount you will accept to sell this
idea.

You have a venture idea which has a 95% chance to get a $200,000 payoff and a 5% chance
to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the minimum amount you will accept to sell this idea.

You have a venture idea which has a 50% chance to get a $200,000 payoff and a 50%
chance to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the minimum amount you will accept to sell this
idea.

You have a venture idea which has a 25% chance to get a $500,000 payoff and a 75%
chance to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the minimum amount you will accept to sell this
idea.
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You have a venture idea which has a 50% chance to get a $200,000 payoff and a 50%
chance to lose money, but the amount of loss is unknown. Please tell us the minimum
amount you will accept to sell this idea.
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Please indicate that how you evaluated the above venture ideas:

Mcheck1 I made my decisions fast, intuitively and unconsciously.








Strongly Disagree (1)
Disagree (2)
Slightly Disagree (3)
Neither Agree nor Disagree (4)
Slightly Agree (5)
Agree (6)
Strongly Agree (7)

I made my decisions slowly, analytically and consciously.








Strongly Disagree (1)
Disagree (2)
Slightly Disagree (3)
Neither Agree nor Disagree (4)
Slightly Agree (5)
Agree (6)
Strongly Agree (7)
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Please tell us more about yourself:

What is your gender?
 Male (1)
 Female (2)
What is your race?








White/Caucasian (1)
African American (2)
Hispanic (3)
Asian (4)
Native American (5)
Pacific Islander (6)
Other (7)
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What was your age as of January 1, 2014?








































Under 18 (1)
18 (2)
19 (3)
20 (4)
21 (5)
22 (6)
23 (7)
24 (8)
25 (9)
26 (10)
27 (11)
28 (12)
29 (13)
30 (14)
31 (15)
32 (16)
33 (17)
34 (18)
35 (19)
36 (20)
37 (21)
38 (22)
39 (23)
40 (24)
41 (25)
42 (26)
43 (27)
44 (28)
45 (29)
46 (30)
47 (31)
48 (32)
49 (33)
50 (34)
51 (35)
52 (36)
53 (37)
54 (38)
55 (39)
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56 (40)
57 (41)
58 (42)
59 (43)
60 (44)
61 (45)
62 (46)
63 (47)
64 (48)
65 (49)
66 (50)
67 (51)
68 (52)
69 (53)
70 (54)
71 (55)
72 (56)
73 (57)
74 (58)
75 (59)
Over 75 (60)

What is the highest level of education you have completed?









Less than High School (1)
High School / GED (2)
Some College (3)
2-year College Degree (4)
4-year College Degree (5)
Masters Degree (6)
Doctoral Degree (7)
Professional Degree (JD, MD) (8)
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What is your annual income range?












Below $20,000 (1)
$20,000 - $39,999 (2)
$40,000 - $59,999 (4)
$60,000 - $79,999 (6)
$80,000 - $99,999 (7)
$100,000 - $119,999 (9)
$120,000 - $139,999 (5)
$140,000 - $159,999 (3)
$160,000 - $179,999 (12)
$180,000 - $199,999 (13)
$200,000 or more (8)

Do you have the intention to start a business?
 Yes (1)
 No (2)
When do you expect to start this business?






Less than 1 year (1)
1-2 years (2)
3-5 years (3)
6-10 years (4)
more than 10 years (5)

Is your current business family owned?
 Yes (1)
 No (2)
Is your current family business a family succession?
 Yes (1)
 No (2)

112

Does your family business have a family succession envisioned in the future?
 Yes (1)
 No (2)
What is your business's primary activity?





















Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting (23)
Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction (24)
Utilities (25)
Construction (26)
Manufacturing (27)
Wholesale Trade (28)
Retail Trade (29)
Transportation and Warehousing (30)
Information (31)
Finance and Insurance (32)
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing (33)
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services (34)
Management of Companies and Enterprises (35)
Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation Services (36)
Educational Services (37)
Health Care and Social Assistance (38)
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation (39)
Accommodation and Food Services (40)
Public Administration (42)
Other Services (41)
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How long have you owned your current business?














Less than 1 year (1)
1 year (2)
2 years (3)
3 years (4)
4 years (5)
5 years (6)
6 years (7)
7 years (8)
8 years (9)
9 years (10)
10 years (11)
more than 10 years (12)
more than 20 years (13)

How many employees currently work in your business? (Not including yourself)


















0 (1)
1 (2)
2 (3)
3 (4)
4 (5)
5 (6)
6 (7)
7 (8)
8 (9)
9 (10)
10-19 (11)
20-49 (12)
50-99 (13)
100-249 (14)
250-499 (15)
500-999 (16)
1000 or more (17)
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How many companies have you founded in your lifetime?













0 (1)
1 (2)
2 (3)
3 (4)
4 (5)
5 (6)
6 (7)
7 (8)
8 (9)
9 (10)
10 (11)
over 10 (12)

How long is it since you founded your first company?













Less than 1 year (1)
1 year (2)
2 years (3)
3 years (4)
4 years (5)
5 years (6)
6 years (7)
7 years (8)
8 years (9)
9 years (10)
10 years (11)
More than 10 years (12)
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